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*** Pre-Congress Attack on Antall in Csurka's Paper**

93CH0360A Budapest MAGYAR FORUM in Hungarian 21 Jan 93 p 1

[Article by Elemer Farkas: "Antall and Csurka"]

[Text] A significant segment of the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] membership has lulled itself into a dream, according to which Jozsef Antall's political leadership qualities and Istvan Csurka's clear ideas—calling a spade a spade when expressing the Hungarian national outlook and sentiments—could be mutually reconciled if Jozsef Antall retained his leadership position in both the party and the government, and if, in the course of his work, he essentially pursued politics reflecting Istvan Csurka's perceptions, thus realizing his ideas.

In other words: Very many people would like to see Jozsef Antall's government program built on Istvan Csurka's ideology. Although devoid of any rational element, this illusion also emerged at nominating conventions preceding the National Congress. At these meetings Jozsef Antall clearly won the national chairman's post, while Istvan Csurka received the broadest possible support to become a member of the national presidium. Local organizations making these nominations did not see any contradiction in this.

There was a huge uproar at the 29 November 1992 Chairmen's Meeting when someone very cautiously mentioned the possibility of making a choice between Antall and Csurka. Some timid attempts to mention this personal and political conflict were also made at local organizations, but these were always rejected: The membership expects the MDF's two most striking politicians to set aside their differences and to act in the country's—and in the MDF's—interest.

This should be accomplished as a result of Antall's high standard, professional political discourse, and, based on Csurka's clear expression of what a majority of us feels and thinks, preferably without exaggerations.

The time has come to stop beating around the bush and to make clear that the MDF membership is waiting for such cooperation in vain. Antall and Csurka have already gone their separate ways spiritually, politically, and emotionally; all they are waiting for is an occasion to make this rift apparent. Ever since the end of August, Jozsef Antall has been determined to get rid of Csurka, whom he regards as a political bull in his highly coveted china shop. But Antall knows, of course, that he cannot get rid of Csurka in just any way, because of Csurka's popularity. For this reason Antall endeavors to remove Csurka by rendering him absurd, and, in the end, by making him leave on his own.

In contrast, until recently, Csurka had steadfastly hoped that his influence on Antall and the government, and on MDF politics, would gradually increase, and that as a

result this influence, he would achieve the most important goal: to return the MDF to its original program, to the promises made during the elections that enjoyed such great support in the spring of 1990, and whose contents can be summarized very briefly: In the framework of the system change, the Hungarian people create a new homeland for themselves, do justice for themselves, compensate, privatize, and weave a safety net for themselves, and nurture culture, increase knowledge, and so on for themselves. This "for themselves" includes everyone who lives here, everyone who accepts the common fate, who wants to prosper with the Hungarian people and not to the detriment of the Hungarian people.

In other words, in the spring of 1990 the Hungarian people voted for a democratic, humane, tolerant, and nation-centered system change. The same kind of system change as defined, expressed, and demanded in Istvan Csurka's "thoughts."

A system change that has been performed by the government and parliament only in part and with hesitation despite the unquestionable accomplishments, and at best, above the heads of people, leaving the people out of the system change, and even condescendingly, while lecturing to the people.

I believe that Istvan Csurka has less and less faith in being able to appropriately influence Jozsef Antall, the government, and the MDF leadership rallying around Antall. He has less and less faith, and therefore he is gradually giving up with these attempts. But surrendering these attempts could only have one of two consequences. One possible consequence would be an open rift with Antall and his group. The other alternative would be silence and adaptation to the situation ruled by Antall in order to create a semblance of unity, to avoid an open clash and division in the MDF. Csurka is strongly inclined to sacrifice his person and his personal interests for the goals he pursues. But sacrifices must make sense. Let's see whether it is worthwhile for Csurka to retreat?

The following developments could be expected if Csurka stepped aside and yielded the MDF to Antall and his group:

—Disappointment and lethargy—presently tempered by the vitality and commitment of the populist-national-plebeian line—would culminate within the MDF. This would result in a nationwide loss of credibility and loss of people coupled with internal crisis increasing to the point of helplessness and an inability to operate, prompting part of the remaining membership to leave, and reshaping the MDF into an extremely narrow, elitist little party.

—No one would carry on with the MDF's national policies, the ideals that focus on national values. Since Jozsef Antall and his group has lost its political popularity, and since the MDF led by Antall is facing a grave fiasco in the next elections, Antall is no longer fit to salvage and to carry on the MDF's permanent

and distinctive values. Anyone who yields the terrain to Antall today, surrenders the original MDF dream and all the values represented by the MDF from the beginning. Accordingly, Csurka must not yield the MDF to Antall, and he is not going to do so, unless the MDF, in its present, decomposed state, decides at its National Congress to exclude Csurka and to place all power into Antall's hands. The election of a National Presidium in which Csurka would be a member, but everyone else would unconditionally follow Jozsef Antall, would amount to Csurka's exclusion. A solution like this would isolate Csurka, and would, in practice, degrade every endeavor of his into a mere deviance. One could hardly imagine Csurka agreeing to a situation like this.

In contrast, Jozsef Antall could not agree to a situation in which the MDF National Congress turned around and allowed the populist-national-plebeian line to advance.

Antall would not be able to cooperate with a National Presidium in which he could not enforce his will, and without a presidium in which he could enforce his will, he probably would not even agree to govern.

Without going into complex details, the result of this would be a cabinet crisis, followed by elections rescheduled for an earlier date, probably for the fall of 1993. The question is this: What would the country, and what would the MDF, put at risk? This question cannot be answered accurately, of course, because the future is the future because it is unknown. Nevertheless it would be appropriate to make certain guesses.

First of all I would like to underscore the view according to which the MDF has reached a political low point, it has lost all its popularity, so that the MDF has really nothing to lose.

Anything that could happen, would probably be a gain for the MDF.

And as long as the MDF has nothing of substance to lose, the national cause represented in essence only by the MDF—or which it should represent, at least—has nothing to lose either. Even if much would be left uncertain, admitting that “we have nothing to lose” should give us courage to act.

Accordingly, the greatest concerns are the loss of the parliamentary majority, a cabinet crisis, and possibly the advanced elections. But do we have a majority in parliament? I will venture to say that this majority is a mere semblance by now, it is the captive of various groups. Joint action by 20 or 30 representatives could prevent the adoption of any intent expressed by the government, even if these representatives would not be able to force through their own will. But there is more than one group of 20 or 30 representatives within the coalition, and by now the viability of decisions depends on agreement by these representatives. In other words, a united, reliable

coalition majority has already become a fiction, and even at this point, the government no longer controls the situation in parliament.

Insofar as Jozsef Antall, as the head of government, is concerned, he could be replaced by any one of several persons. To accomplish this, one only has to free himself from the myth that Antall is irreplaceable. But this is not so simple because of his extremely impressive personality. And yet, we must get over this shock, because in today's situation Jozsef Antall is no longer successful in serving the MDF's interests. His person no longer forges success; he is much rather an impediment. The great loss of his popularity and related explanations are definitive factors.

As the situation stands today, the election prospects are, by all means, bad from the standpoint of the MDF. These will turn into the worst possible prospects if the situation remains unchanged, with Jozsef Antall at the top.

The MDF's chances would definitely improve if it could distance itself from the government and the prime minister, both of which have lost their popularity.

Csurka recognizes this very clearly: One should at least make an attempt to salvage the MDF from the depressing shadow of a government that had become unpopular.

The way we stand today, winning the election is no longer the goal; we are aiming for minimizing the loss. To accomplish this we must renew the personnel and the organization of the MDF.

Accordingly, there is no realistic consideration which would not justify severing ourselves from Jozsef Antall and the group close to him. What is the situation with Csurka?

If the elections were held today, a much larger group would rally around Csurka than around Antall. The concern is that Csurka, an outstanding thinker and writer, a person who expresses the sentiments and outlook of very many people, has not shown any real leadership qualities so far.

A leader must be a good organizer and a manager type today. Csurka is neither of these. Csurka is a clear-thinking, pensive, scrupulous person who relies on the self-inspired, conscientious work of others, rather than providing conscious, tough direction to people. He falls far short of today's criteria for good leadership, as established by modern management science.

Therefore, quite obviously, Csurka should play a role in which he could stand out: thinking through social and political problems, developing the details of the outlook and positions, designating goals—in sum, he should play a leadership role in providing ideals and ideology. Administrative direction, the management tasks within the MDF, in parliament and the government should be

left to young managers with modern education, professional masters of their trade able to implement what they agreed to do.

Having said all this, I still do not want to be unfair to Jozsef Antall. His magnificent, traditional preparedness, his highly impressive personality, his familiarity with and ability to master the history of European politics, renders him as an outstanding personality of this day and age, and he should not be blamed for the ill-matched relationship between his subjective features and opportunities on the one hand, and the requirements of our day and age, on the other.

A chess player can use his knowledge only against another chess player; he will certainly lose if someone holds a gun at him.

Jozsef Antall had no and has no partners in the Hungarian opposition, because, unfortunately, today's Hungarian opposition follows different rules. The problems are even more aggravated if we recognize what has become increasingly clear in the course of years: The relationship between Jozsef Antall and the MDF with the largest base constituency—the fundamentalist MDF, if you will—is not free of disturbance either. Analyzing this disturbance would require a separate study, however.

These thoughts have no real significance from the standpoint of where we go from here, and from the standpoint of where we go from here the only thing that counts is the situation that has actually evolved: For whatever reason, Jozsef Antall has lost his political popularity; he no longer advances, but impedes the MDF's political success by now.

One thing appears to be certain: Antall and Csurka are no longer able to row in the same boat.

This is the tricky issue to be resolved by the MDF National Congress. It must be resolved soberly, with a purpose, and with the least amount of passion, keeping in mind the country, the Hungarian people, and the national interest.

We will be deploying mines on the path ahead of us unless we resolve this issue, if we cover up this problem—mines that will explode very fast.

* Katona on Promoting 'Nonpartisan' Media

93CH0361A Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 2 Feb 93 p 1

[MTI report: "The Szechenyi University Extension Center in Nagycenk"]

[Text] Tamas Katona, the political state secretary at the Prime Minister's Office, held the introductory lecture in the series on the timely problems of the mass media, which is being offered by the Istvan Szechenyi University Extension Center, located in the Szechenyi Manor in Nagycenk. The government is accountable to the people

and has a duty to inform, said the state secretary. But radio and television have not been the government's partners in discharging that duty. This type of cooperation must be established among the government, the political parties, and the mass media.

The state secretary pointed out that conditions for non-partisan dissemination of information have not been created, and the BBC's rules have not been realized. He emphasized the importance of nonpartisan mass media and denied that the government wants government-controlled radio and television. He expressed the hope that perhaps the tone, which has become so intolerant and acrimonious under the influence exerted by a few individuals, could now be changed. In his opinion, it is in entire society's interest to put an end to the media war as soon as possible. He argued that Hungarian Radio's new draft rules of organization and procedure, modeled on the BBC's rules, will prevent Hungarian Radio's president from assuming dictatorial powers, whereas the present rules enable him to do so. Firm managers, rather than highly respected social scientists, are needed at both Hungarian Radio and Hungarian Television, concluded the state secretary.

* Parliament Discusses Skinhead Incidents

93CH0361B Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 2 Feb 93 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Parliamentary Journal: About Skinheads, Before Proceeding With the Business of the Day"]

[Text] The spring session of parliament opened yesterday afternoon. At the sitting of the full parliament, before proceeding with the business of the day, Deputy Izabella B. Kiraly (MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum]) requested permission to address parliament. Because her request did not have the support of the MDF caucus, Speaker Gyorgy Szabad put the question of whether to grant permission to a vote. Permission having been granted, Izabella B. Kiraly discussed the responsibility of the mass media in conjunction with the incident on Dobrentei Square in Budapest. In her opinion, the press wants to use the incidents to discredit nationalist-minded Hungarian youths and herself as well.

Interior Minister Peter Boros requested to be recognized, in order to recall two recent incidents. In conjunction with the Dobrentei Square incident he emphasized that there could be no defense for displaying the swastika in Hungary—it had appeared also on Dobrentei Square—since the swastika was the emblem under which millions had been murdered, and it had also played a role in the loss of Hungary's freedom. The other incident he brought up had occurred in Kobanya, where a 17-year-old girl had been stabbed. The girl felt that she had been attacked for being a Jew, because previously she had been harassed for that reason on several occasions.

The minister said that the police did not know about this latter claim, but the investigation was continuing. In conclusion he again emphasized that in Hungary there is no discrimination based on religion or race; furthermore, that the Hungarian authorities were acting in that spirit, and were treating this question with the importance it deserves. The MP's then turned to deliberating the question of putting legislative bills on the calendar. (The National Assembly was still sitting as we went to press.)

*** Communist-Era Statute of Limitation Reexamined**

93CH0361C Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 2 Feb 93 p 12

[Article by Dr. Gabor Jobbagyi: "The Administration of Justice, and Reality"]

[Text] *One of the fundamental questions that the change of political systems has raised is whether criminal proceedings should now be instituted for the flagrant abuses committed on a mass scale during the period of the party-state, and whether the perpetrators should now be convicted and punished? By and large, the lineup of the forces for and against criminal prosecution emerged a year ago. The ruling parties want some legal form of criminal proceedings, while the opposition parties are willing to accept only investigation of the crimes and the naming of the criminals, but reject criminal proceedings and sentencing. In the opposition parties' opinion, the statute of limitation bars prosecution for the most serious crimes, and they cannot be properly investigated anyhow, because of the lapse of time.*

The problem is unprecedented in the history of Hungarian law. Millions of people were deprived of all their rights, hundreds of thousands were deprived of their liberty, and thousands were murdered, all with the help of the state's repressive apparatuses. Well, providing a legal answer to such a situation has been added only in this century to the tasks of Europe's jurists. An answer is rendered more difficult by the fact that, although the political system's very essence did not change, it functioned in a more consolidated form for decades after the "great terror," and then expired, practically in the course of peaceful evolution. Consequently, the murderers and jailers lived for decades together with their victims, in a peculiar sort of forced symbiosis that seemed peaceful, but one of its fundamental principles was that the veil shrouding the past could not be lifted.

The jailers' political system collapsed peacefully, and then the victims were confronted with the question of what to do about the peacefully departing mass murderers.

The essence of the Zetenyi-Takacs bill, the first legislative bill on administering justice, was that the outlawry which prevailed during the past decades precluded the applicability of the statute of limitation, and thus the period of limitation actually began to run only from the change of political systems. The Constitutional Court

declared this legislative bill unconstitutional, and then it seemed to very many people that there is no legal way of administering justice. The reality, however, is quite different. In international law and Hungarian law as well, the statute of limitation does not bar prosecution for the most serious crimes, the crimes against peace and crimes against humanity. Essentially this fact is the common root from which the latest legislative bills on administering justice stem, namely the government's bill and the bill of the KDNP [Christian Democratic People's Party].

The Definition of War

Elaboration of the concept of the KDNP's bill on administering justice began in the spring of 1992, after the Constitutional Court had declared the Zetenyi-Takacs bill unconstitutional. The assembled group of experts—it included also jurists specializing in criminal law, as well as experts on international law—immediately reached agreement on several initial fundamental questions. There was complete agreement that the Constitutional Court had ruled not on administering justice for the previous political system's crimes in general, but merely on one specific form of administering justice. There was also agreement that the principles of international law and human-rights conventions—which also Hungary had ratified—were a suitable basis for resolving the issue. A consensus was reached also about the expediency of treating separately—within a legislative package on administering justice—the crimes committed in 1956 and the subsequent period, because there had been ample international condemnations of these crimes at the time. And it was likewise accepted without any dissenting opinion that the suppression of the 1956 revolution and fight for freedom took place in what international law regards as war.

Thus the KDNP's point of departure is that the 1956 revolution and fight for freedom were suppressed in war, in the course of which war crimes were committed that can be judged on the basis of international law and the conventions on human rights.

What are the arguments that can be lined up to support the contention that there was war in Hungary after 23 October 1956?

A declaration of war, and uniformed troops on either side are not necessary conditions for a war. Any major armed conflict and even civil war may be included in the category of war (according to the Hague and Geneva conventions). Consequently, the international conventions on war do not apply solely to "regular" wars. At the same time, it should be noted that the sources of international law rarely use the term "war" and prefer to speak of "force" and "aggression" (Articles 2 and 51 of the UN Charter, for instance). These are terms that lend themselves to much broader interpretation.

In addition, there are also numerous practical corroborations of the fact that 1956 was a tragic war. Between

1956 and 1963, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a total of 24 resolutions condemning the events in Hungary.

The most important General Assembly resolutions on Hungary were as follows:

In 1956:

- The General Assembly unambiguously established that Soviet military force was used to suppress the aspirations of the Hungarian people, and this fact invoked the duty of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security.
- The General Assembly called on the Soviet Union to cease its armed attack and to refrain from all other forms of intervention.
- According to the General Assembly, the purpose of intervention was to deny the Hungarian people the enjoyment of their fundamental rights, freedom and independence.
- The General Assembly demanded an end to repression and armed intervention.

In 1957:

- Accepting the draft resolution of its special commission, the General Assembly established that armed intervention deprived Hungary of political independence, and that the Hungarian authorities were violating human rights and fundamental freedoms.

In 1958:

- The General Assembly condemned the continuing suppression of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as the execution of Imre Nagy and others. And it called for an end to mass reprisals.

In its 1957 report, the special commission appointed by the United Nations established that "the war which the Soviet Union waged in Hungary was fought in the cities." "Soviet intervention" and "Soviet military occupation" were mentioned repeatedly. The report found that Janos Kadar, "a handful of politicians" and the secret police had been the Soviet authorities' supporters. About the very beginning, the report declared: "And that is how the fighting between the people of Budapest and the Soviet forces began."

Volleys Fired With Impunity

We are unable to quote from all of the numerous international statements and will have to confine ourselves to the two most recent ones: President Gorbachev and also President Yeltsin have essentially apologized to the Hungarian people for 1956. All this, I believe, supports the contention that in 1956 there was war in Hungary, both according to international law and Hungarian law. In the course of this war there were very serious violations of international law and human rights, on three counts:

- On 22 occasions, volleys of shots were fired into crowds of peaceful demonstrators, killing many hundreds of them.

- During the reprisals, with complete disregard for legal norms, many hundreds of death sentences were passed, and prisoners were tortured.
- The leaders and "restorers of order" cooperated with the unlawful Soviet intervention.

For international conventions—which also Hungary has ratified—demand very specific behavior of the belligerents in time of war.

International law regards as "crimes against the peace and security of mankind" the offenses that fall in this category. The formulated mandatory rules and principles are the results of a lengthy developmental process. The point of departure was the statute of the International Military Tribunal that was set up on 8 August 1945. In that statute the victorious Great Powers had to confront a particular problem, namely the fact that Nazi war criminals could not have been prosecuted under the German laws then in force, or under the laws of any other country.

Prior to 1945, in other words, there was no law on the basis of which acts of terrorism and flagrant abuses committed on a mass scale could have been punished. Laws with retroactive force had to be enacted to make prosecution for such crimes possible. It was the task of the International Military Tribunal to formulate the legal basis of prosecution, and one of the principles of international law established by that tribunal remains valid to this day—namely, that prosecution for such crimes is feasible on the basis of *ex post facto* laws. Thus, in the case of these crimes, international law has rescinded the *nullum crimen sine lege* [no crime without prior legislation] doctrine, which is one of the cornerstones of modern criminal codes. Proof that the aforementioned principle of international law remains in force to this day is the fact that it has been incorporated also into the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, duly ratified and promulgated in Hungary. (Cf. Section 15, Paragraph 2, of Law No. 8/1976. It is extremely interesting that the opponents of administering justice remain despicably silent about this fact!)

On the basis of its statute, the International Military Tribunal passed sentences that established numerous legal principles, which the UN General Assembly subsequently endorsed, thereby legitimating the so-called "Nuremberg principles." In 1947 the General Assembly instructed the International Law Commission to draft an international code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind.

The two fundamental principles of this draft code are as follows:

1. The statute of limitation does not bar prosecution for crimes against the peace and security of mankind (New York Convention of 1968); and
2. The doctrine *bannig ex post facto* laws does not apply to such crimes (cf. above).

These principles were incorporated subsequently into numerous international conventions that Hungary has ratified and promulgated, thereby making them a part of Hungarian law. From the viewpoint administering justice, these conventions can be classified into two groups. The first group comprises the conventions that were a part of Hungarian law already in 1956. (For instance, the 1949 Geneva Convention on Protecting the Victims of War, and the 1948 New York Convention on Genocide. But we may include here also the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty, and certain provisions of the United Nations Charter as well.) The government's bill on administering justice is based on all these statutory regulations (including Hungarian Law No. VII/1945 on War Crimes) that were in force at the time and place when and where the crimes were committed, and are in force at present as well.

Will There Be Criminal Prosecution?

The KDNP's bill (prepared by Dr. Miklos Gaspar) likewise incorporates all these statutory regulations, but it takes into account also the development of international law since 1956. In other words, this bill is based essentially on the International Law Commission's draft code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind, which the UN General Assembly adopted in 1991.

Thus both bills start out from the same principles. The only difference between them is that the government's bill is based on statutory regulations that were in force at the time and place of the crimes' commission and have remained in force to this day, whereas the KDNP's (Dr. Miklos Gaspar's) bill takes into consideration also the law's development since 1956.

Two new bills proposed by Zsolt Zetenyi differ from both of the above bills. The cornerstone of Zetenyi's two bills is that they treat the question of administering justice uniformly for the entire period from 21 December 1944 through 23 October 1989. In principle and practice, according to these bills, it would be respectively possible and necessary to institute criminal proceedings for all serious crimes—i.e., crimes punishable by prison sentences of more than five years—that were committed during the 45 years but were not prosecuted for political reasons. Only the court would have competence to determine, after a full trial and conviction, whether the statute of limitation bars punishment for the given crime. Or, according to Zetenyi's second bill, the period of limitation was unable to run, because the state—without a valid legal reason—had failed to prosecute.

In the sense of Zetenyi's second bill, then, the statute of limitation does not bar punishment for a crime; which means that sentencing is also possible. In other words, even if Zetenyi's second bill failed to become law, criminal proceedings would still be possible.

It is absolutely essential to point out that the bills from three different sources are by no means mutually exclusive.

Neither the government's bill nor the KDNP's waives the right to prosecute for crimes other than war crimes, while Zetenyi's bill [as published] covers also the period before 1956.

Essentially all three [as published] bills serve the same purpose, through different approaches. Therefore it is conceivable that all three might become law, thereby giving the courts a sort of option to choose among the modes of administering justice.

Besides passage in parliament, of course, all this also presupposes that the enacted laws will survive intact their review by the Constitutional Court. The outcome of that review is unpredictable. We may perhaps venture to say this much: The government's bill and that of the KDNP (Dr. Miklos Gaspar) propose solutions that have not been considered at all by the court before, whereas Zsolt Zetenyi's bills are founded more or less on the antecedents and the experience to date.

It is essential that we dwell also on how justice is being administered in practice. It will be remembered that six survivors of the volley of shots fired at demonstrators in Mosonmagyaróvár on 26 October 1956, when about a hundred of them were killed, filed information against the perpetrators, charging them with crimes against peace and crimes against humanity. The survivors who signed the information included also Dr. Miklos Gaspar and this writer. Here the point of departure was the same as in the government's bill and in that of the KDNP—i.e., that the committed crimes are war crimes to which the statute of limitation does not apply, and which are punishable also under existing Hungarian law. But the judge advocate in Győr, and the Office of the Judge Advocate General begged to differ. In their decisions they refused to investigate the charges, claiming that the statute of limitation barred prosecution for the crime. Hungarian judge advocates have thereby granted safe conduct to the perpetrators of a war crime of unprecedented atrocity. Or more accurately, they have declared exempt from criminal prosecution and punishment the persons who respectively ordered and fired all 22 volleys of shots in 1956. The decisions of the judge advocates violate the Constitution on several counts and are based on intentional misinterpretation of the basic principles of our prevailing international law. Moreover, the judge advocates are in conflict also with the Constitutional Court's decision that states: "Only the court may render a final decision—i.e., one that is binding in the given case and on everyone in general as well—that the statute of limitation bars prosecution for the crime." For all these reasons, the informants turned to the Constitutional Court. Thereupon the state prosecutor general, acting on information Zsolt Zetenyi and two of his fellow MP's had filed in October 1992, ordered an investigation of war-crimes charges against the government and party leaders in 1956.

Up to now the opposition has always been against plans to administer justice through the courts. According to the opposition's current strategy, it is enough "to name the criminals," because that in itself provides sufficient moral condemnation. Since the present government came to office, however, the opposition has not named a single "criminal." Up to now all public revelations of crimes have been made, in one way or another, by the ruling parties. Aside from that, the mere naming of the criminals is no solution. Without the necessary resources and the availability of legal remedies, a committee of historians, a private investigator or even a parliamentary committee would necessarily be subjective; also, the likelihood of error would be much greater than in the case of criminal proceedings conducted within the legal framework of a rule-of-law state.

Perhaps for that very reason, the "namings" to date have often led to actions for slander or libel, creating the peculiar situation that the one-time mass murderers are now appearing in the role of accusers! The memory of the hundreds of thousands of victims, and the sufferings of the millions of survivors place on the state the primary responsibility of administering justice, strictly within the law, for the most serious crimes of the past decades.

*** SZDSZ MP Assesses Viability of Legislature**

93CH0375C Budapest TALLOZO in Hungarian
7 Jan 93 pp 21-22

[Interview with Alajos Dornbach, National Assembly vice president and Alliance of Free Democrats representative, by "Gy.A.-L.Z."; place and date not given: "Had We Eliminated Certain Pseudo Debates"—reprinted from NAPI, 4 Jan 93]

[Text] *Taking action against the illegal actions of the government is much more difficult in Hungary than in other civil democracies. The SZDSZ-MDF [Alliance of Free Democrats-Hungarian Democratic Forum] pact of long ago produced its fruits, but it also made it virtually impossible for parliament to obligate the government to cease activities in violation of laws. Even though among all the parliaments in postsocialist states the Hungarian National Assembly produced the most results, its actions have gaps, are objectionable from a professional standpoint, and are influenced by daily politics. We discussed all this with Alajos Dornbach, the vice president of the House.*

[Question] Are you satisfied with the legislative activities of parliament? To what extent have the new laws provided a foundation for the economic system change?

[Dornbach] I am not satisfied, even though I know that the National Assembly would not have been able to create more laws. Had we eliminated certain pseudo debates, we could have enacted one or two more laws during the available time. It serves as small consolation to me that in our East European milieu ours is still the most successfully functioning parliament. The main reason for my dissatisfaction is that we are conducting

an awful lot of futile debate only because of the inadequate preparation of laws. If these laws were prepared professionally, we could substantially cut the length of parliamentary debate. Some of the legislative proposals are introduced without the government reconciling them first with its own parliamentary faction, and thus a substantial number of amendments are offered by ruling party representatives. This amounts to an anachronism in the histories of parliamentary democracies.

[Question] Wasn't the work of the House made easier by the fact that the previous government had left behind a number of fundamental economic legislative proposals in the desk drawers?

[Dornbach] We have run out of the laws inherited from the previous government a long time ago. We had to develop a number of fundamentally new laws, such as the one about converting cooperatives. Even with respect to this law the government did not use (perhaps it was unable to use) the traditional, circumspect methods of preparation. In other cases, too, we received proposals with lax composition more than once, and we debated those immediately. But even in instances when we had a few months to prepare ourselves, the representatives were unable to utilize the time available because of the large volume of work they had to perform. In every field we are performing hasty, brush-fire-fighting work, and professional mistakes are the natural consequences of such work. The fact that based on political considerations parliament spends time debating secondary issues has a negative effect on the performance of parliament. Frequently, the ruling coalition majority uses certain topics to serve its own short-term political goals—topics that are insignificant from the standpoint of economic transformation. These controversies only serve to arouse or to channel passions.

[Question] Those noteworthy economic laws have suffered as a result of this situation: The bankruptcy, financial institutions, and state household laws must all be amended because they were unable to withstand the test in practice.

[Dornbach] The need to amend the cooperative law became immediately apparent. This law is in force until 31 December, but we are still debating the amendments today (29 December 1992—the editor). All this creates negative phenomena in the economy. Some shortcomings caused "tragedies": I am convinced that, for example, the bank scandals of last summer would not have occurred, had the appropriate guarantees not been omitted from the financial institutions law.

[Question] This parliament has become akin to a horse: It is forced to eat the fodder that's put in front of it. This is why it has become loose, liquid, and has not been taken seriously by the public.

[Dornbach] Exactly, but parliament is not the one that chose to suffer in a mistaken role; the circumstances forced parliament to struggle and to torment itself by trying to perform only one of its numerous functions:

legislation. It would be at least as important for parliament to oversee the government's work, but only very meager opportunities exist to do so. We have failed to act regarding some grave and hardly forgivable issues: For example, the State Accounting Office [ASZ] has prepared two or three reports in response to which we should have taken positions by all means, and, in certain instances, should have obligated the government to discontinue the irregularities. The activities of the State Property Agency [AVU] are the most sensitive from the standpoint of the economy, yet, in certain respects, the AVU does not satisfy even the minimum expectations. For two years the AVU has been operating without authorized property policy guidelines, even though that situation is illegal. The AVU's organizational and operating rules have not been prepared either. Unfortunately, the legality of certain aspects of AVU's operations has been questionable from the outset.

[Question] In the AVU's case the identity of the cabinet member whom parliament could hold responsible for the illegalities is obvious!

[Dornbach] It's not so simple, however. In the course of an interpellation the other day, the government was asked whether it would hold to account those who caused the banks go bankrupt. The question was put to the prime minister, but the minister without portfolio having jurisdiction responded on the prime minister's behalf. A majority in parliament did not accept the response, yet this refusal to accept the response had no consequence whatsoever. As things stand today, it makes no sense to enter a no-confidence motion against the government, and therefore the government is able to avoid being held to account. It is more difficult to oust the cabinet in Hungary than in other civil democracies, and therefore it can be forced to change the irregularities only as a result of publicized pressure. The relative stability of the government acts as a positive factor in certain respects, but it renders the oversight of the government very difficult.

[Question] Simply put, we are talking about the MDF-SZDSZ pact. But who would have thought at the time that the government would not use this agreement for the benefit of the country?

[Dornbach] This also has some favorable aspects. Hungary is the only postsocialist country in which the initial democratic government remains in power.

[Question] In this transitional situation the parliament should also be active as a national assembly framing the constitution.

[Dornbach] Two years ago I, too, believed that we would soon need a new constitution. At this point I believe that this subject is going to be placed on the agenda within a year or two. We need a broader consensus to frame a constitution that is valid for an extended period of time, we cannot rely on a fragile majority in this regard. The present political groundwork is not suited for the drafting of a new constitution. The present Constitution

is appropriate for the transition; it includes every important basic principle. Reverting to the work of parliament, it would not be fair for me to mention only the mistakes and to disregard the achievements. I regard the fact that a modern institutional system has evolved as a positive achievement, by all means; I have in mind here the banks, for example.

[Question] Nevertheless, a few institutions whose "modern" character could be questioned have also come about....

[Dornbach] I believe that the concentration of property to remain under long-term state ownership at the AVRt [State Property Management Corporation] is based on a mistaken and dangerous concept.

[Question] Besides being the vice president of parliament, you are also active in party politics. Last year the SZDSZ suffered from a grave crisis; it appears that it managed to overcome that crisis. Do you share this view?

[Dornbach] I agree. Not even for a moment was I concerned that the SZDSZ would lose its significance, that negative processes would be reinforced. In the course of a year we managed to overcome the greatest difficulties. A dozen people regularly traveled throughout the country since January....

[Question] Did the inner circle of the founding fathers swarm over the countryside?

[Dornbach] No, that's out of question, I passionately object to this kind of labeling! The group that rallied under the liberal platform cannot be identified as the so-called hard core. Our efforts were aimed at renewing the party. Last year the SZDSZ underwent a catharsis, a process that also began in the other two great parties, except that in those two parties they swept it under the rug before the process became obvious. A few people left the ranks of the SZDSZ, and I am truly sorry for having to see some of these go. Nevertheless, being offended, the failure to satisfy personal ambitions serves as a factor everywhere in the world, which suggests the need to take certain steps. We should have paid attention to this earlier.

[Question] All this suggests that at this point the SZDSZ has acquired a favorable position....

[Dornbach] This party has become united from an intellectual and political standpoint, more united than at any time before. We were able to clarify most of the conflicting views. Having differences of opinion in a party is normal, but these can be managed only as long as they remain within the limits of tolerance that are normal in a civilized civil democracy.

[Question] I was thinking of SZDSZ's need to broadcast before the next elections that it was a force capable of governing. The question is this: Do the people need the SZDSZ? The odd aspects of the operations of parliament cast a shadow on every party seated in parliament.

[Dornbach] Every party seated in parliament is going to suffer in the election struggle from the fact that the workings of parliament are unpopular. Most citizens do not distinguish between the roles and responsibilities of the ruling parties and the opposition parties. Quite naturally, society cannot be blamed for shortcomings in public awareness.

[Question] During the past years the Hungarian political elite has disembowled itself; it has virtually no private life. How do you cope with this unfavorable situation?

[Dornbach] Long ago I had a lively social life, but as of recently I had little time, energy, and mood left for social life. Sometimes months pass before I get enough rest. I am consciously trying to change this situation, because I need to meet more people. I met countless people every day when I practiced law, and I miss meeting people very much. At this time I have no opportunity to seek contact with new social strata. On occasion I have time left for some sporting activities; I went surfing three times last summer, and in January I will go skiing for a week.

*** Credit Guarantee Corporation President's Views**

93CH0375A Budapest HETI MAGYARORSZAG in
Hungarian 15 Jan 93 p 11

[Interview with Credit Guarantee Corporation President Kornel Apatini by Krisztina Pecs; place and date not given: "Credit (world)—Guarantee; The Goal Is To Stimulate Enterprising"]

[Text] *The founding charter of the Credit Guarantee Corporation was signed in December 1992, five months after the related government decision, and the organization is actually going to begin functioning in February. The president and chairwoman of the corporation, Mrs. Kornel Apatini, completed her studies at the University of Economics in the field of foreign trade; she speaks three languages and has several decades of financial experience. She was invited to head the new organization from her previous position at Timesco Corporation, where she served as director of capital management. She believes that in her new position she could take advantage of her experience in the fields of both macro- and micro-economics. The president and chairwoman told us that the founding charter was signed by 70 persons on behalf of financial institutions and entrepreneurs' interest groups. The institution was established with 3.5 billion forints in basic capital, of which 2 billion forints represented privatization revenues allocated by the government. An additional amount of 1.4 billion forints was contributed by banks and savings cooperatives, and 100 million forints by the Hungarian Entrepreneurial Development Fund. Incidentally, the stock corporation is open, anyone can join at any time.*

[Pecs] Is the 3.5-billion-forint basic capital going to be sufficient in 1993? What sources will you have available to increase this amount in the future?

[Apatini] Based on a policy adopted by the board of directors we will be able to provide guarantees amounting to 8 billion forints in 1993. The basic capital cannot be increased within a year from the date of the founding charter, but legal avenues provide an opportunity to increase the amount of available money from other sources. This issue will be decided by the relationship between the authorized amount of cash guarantees and the demand for guarantees. Experience thus far indicates that the amount of the numerous demands represents a multiple of the amount we are able to guarantee. If, in the course of the year, the 8-billion-forint amount proves to be too small, we will request a regrouping of funds in order to enable us to increase the basic capital.

[Pecs] What kind of counter-guarantee structure operates when the corporation helps small and medium-size entrepreneurs?

[Apatini] The entrepreneurs contact the banks, and the banks rate the business plans. Entrepreneurs have no contact with the Credit Guarantee Corporation while their applications for credit guarantees are being judged. Financial institutions request the corporation's cash guarantee only if an applicant entrepreneur does not have the collateral asked for by the financial institutions. If our guarantee committee finds that an entrepreneur meets our conditions, we enter into a guarantee agreement with the financial institution, and this automatically triggers a counter-guarantee agreement with the state budget. The counter-guarantee is managed by the Small Enterprise Guarantee Fund. Our corporation may provide cash guarantees for 80 percent of the amounts loaned by financial institutions, up to a maximum of 100 million forints, and the Small Enterprise Guarantee Fund counter-guarantees 70 percent of the amount we guarantee. In other words, if a loan becomes noncollectible, the financial institution absorbs 20 percent of the amount, our corporation absorbs 24 percent, and the Small Enterprise Guarantee Fund loses 56 percent of the total amount. The counter-guarantee fund began its operations last September with 2 billion forints of capital allocated by the government from privatization revenues. The 1993 budget will further increase this basic capital by 4 billion forints.

[Pecs] The corporation aids the banks and reduces the risks of entrepreneurs. Has a final agreement been reached between the corporation and the banks regarding the procedural order to be followed by the entrepreneurs and the banks, and by the banks and the corporation?

[Apatini] Every bank establishes different criteria vis-a-vis the entrepreneurs. Therefore we are still negotiating with the banks regarding the most appropriate list of questions to be asked, on the basis of which the chances of recovery on a given credit transactions can be determined. We are establishing a risk matrix in order to filter

out subjective elements: We examine the business transactions of the entrepreneur based on various considerations, and we are assigning points to each of these considerations. In the end, the total number of points reveals the magnitude of the risk.

[Pecsi] What experience was used to provide guidance?

[Apatini] A World Bank study reports on the credit guarantee institutional systems, principles, and operating mechanisms in 52 countries. The 40 years of experience of the Bavarian credit guarantee corporation provided real assistance: With the help of their professionals we step by step adopted all of their procedures and judging mechanisms. A U.S. financial advisory firm also provided many good ideas.

[Pecsi] Could the liquidity problems of entrepreneurs be resolved with the help of the corporation?

[Apatini] Experience shows that the main emphasis must be placed on longer term loans, because the terms of these are very favorable as far as interest rates are concerned. Such loans earn interest at a rate of 7-8 percent. At present, cash guarantees provided to owner credit institutions run for 10 years; beginning on 1 February this term will be extended to 15 years. One should not rule out the possibility that we will also provide cash guarantees to operating fund loans, but experience shows that entrepreneurs bridge their typical liquidity problems with shorter term loans. Based on our rules, however, we must reject guarantee applications from enterprises subject to bankruptcy or liquidation proceedings.

[Pecsi] How much do guarantee fees and handling charges amount to?

[Apatini] There is a onetime handling charge for the credit guarantee amounting to 1 percent of the amount guaranteed, and a 1-3 percent guarantee fee, depending on the risk. This is not a small amount from the standpoint of the borrower, but it is far less than the 7-8 percent guarantee fee asked for by banks.

[Pecsi] At what point can the cash guarantee be cashed in?

[Apatini] According to our rules only after the banks have called on debtors to comply with their obligations, or if the banks cancelled loan agreements with defaulting clients. In order to keep entrepreneurial ventures alive we would like to see a situation in which banks provide a 30-day grace period to entrepreneurs, because during that time the debtors may be able to resolve their business problems. Negotiations thus far indicate that the heads of banks are willing to accept our proposal.

* Monopoly Group To Check Privatization Corruption

93CH0375B Budapest REFORM in Hungarian
14 Jan 93 p 11

[Interview with MDF representative Imre Korosi, a founding member of the Monopoly Group, by (Szep); place and date not given: "The Crooks of Transition"]

[Text] Based on the Labor Law amended last summer, a state enterprise is prohibited from establishing a competing limited liability corporation, because in such cases the expenditures remain with the founding enterprise, while the limited liability corporation pockets the profits. In turn, the bankrupt founding firm can be bought for a pittance by the owners of the corporation in the framework of privatization. This prohibition was included in the new Labor Law based on an amendment proposed by Monopoly. MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] representative Imre Korosi, one of the founding members of Monopoly, raised the issue of corruption surrounding privatization. They are going to publish the history of completed cases in a book entitled The Crooks of Transition.

[Korosi] The ruling parties stay away from problems arising in the course of privatization. Privatization "tricks" reached their highest point in the case of the former Szeged printing press, where the chairman and president established a limited liability corporation, then took out a 60-million-forint loan from the OTP [National Savings Bank], the cash guarantor became the press itself, and as a result of that the press went bankrupt, of course.

[Szep] The government approved of the foreign privatization, claiming that it amounted to attracting foreign capital.

[Korosi] This was a politically mistaken decision because the national bourgeoisie should have been established first.

[Szep] But why is there so much secrecy about selling the firms and branches of the economy?

[Korosi] At a faction meeting Ivan Szabo said that secrecy was necessary because otherwise our opponents could read our cards. I think that the opposition knows about everything and that they will use this knowledge against us in the election campaign.

[Szep] It seems to me that the ruling party does not mean what it says. While they are talking about the purity of privatization, your fellow MDF members consume a lot of gravy. They not only agree to become members of boards of directors—for no small honoraria—but also become part and parcel of the new buying and selling spree through their family members.

[Korosi] Indeed, those who have something to worry about are the greatest opponents of the privatization

committee. Gyula Takacsy, the chairman of the economic committee, asked whether I intended to make the government fail. No, I do not! All I want to do is to discontinue privatization that has become like the Mafia, and thereby I would like to provide a greater chance in the elections for the MDF! We need no secrecy regarding the contracts, no uncontrollable contracts.

[Szep] Why does the government sweep under the rug the corrupt acts and practices it is aware of?

[Korosi] Because some representatives also took part in this affair, in privatization.

[Szep] In other words, does the government compensate the loyal representatives this way?

[Korosi] That's what the public believes. I think that a potential threat of this exists.

[Szep] How could it happen that the government gave the Chinese state indebtedness to entrepreneurs of questionable reputation?

[Korosi] We should take a look and find out who sponsored these. Just as it is incomprehensible why the failed chairman and president of Hungarocoop could become the head of Roltex.

[Szep] Why do you insist on having a privatization committee? Why doesn't the already existing economic committee perform this task?

[Korosi] Because this would conflict with interests, and everyone is afraid of examining the already existing under the table deals.

[Szep] How much damage was caused by inadequately considered, adverse privatization, to put it mildly?

[Korosi] About 200 billion forints, based only on what I have seen, and including lost tax revenues.

*** Balcerowicz Plan's Inadequacies Critiqued**

93EP0156A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
13 Jan 93 p 3

[Article by Ireneusz Krzeminski: "Barriers to Accessibility: The Prolonged Summer Strikes as Well as the Recent Miners' Strikes Are Due Not So Much to 'Socialist Mentality' as to Social Realities Overlooked by Reformers"]

[Text] The framers and supporters of the market restructuring of the economy generally believe that socialist mentality is its main enemy. That mentality manifests itself in unjustified demands to the government and disregard of the possibilities and common good of the economy. Powerful social groups, especially those that used to be privileged under "real socialism," such as miners of big-industry workers, are now demanding greater security for their status, although it is known that it was precisely the money-losing big industry that has contributed to the country's economic downfall.

An effective restructuring of the economy must presuppose the elimination of that industry in its present shape. Demands and claims reflect parochial group interests that may contribute to halting the reforms and disintegrating the economy completely instead of reviving it. What is more, irresponsible politicians are manipulating that group egotism and thereby contributing to the instability of the precarious order on which the country's future depends. Thus, Poland may turn into a country torn apart by mighty interest groups.

Here I am reproducing the view recently expressed by the creator of the market reform himself, Leszek Balcerowicz. There is no doubt that the "Balcerowicz Plan" was a historic event, and its creator himself is undoubtedly a historic figure. However, the "Balcerowicz Plan" as a program for reforming the social system has from the outset been displaying certain shortcomings.

The weakness of his program is that Balcerowicz failed to allow adequately for the sociological mechanisms of market restructuring. He rather assumed a strong and resolute government authority, which was to exploit the general social support for the reforms in order to resolutely carry out socially costly but totally necessary operations. The rest was to come "automatically" in accordance with the idea of the free market as its own best physician. On the one hand, this was to create new possibilities for "ordinary people" and their initiative, and, on the other, the creation of a system promoting initiative and an efficient and rational management was to assure the effectiveness of the reforms.

The problem lay in excessive confidence in that "social automatism," which turned out to be a utopian assumption. I believe that both the miners' strike and the prolonged summer strikes were due not so much to any "socialist mentality" as to social realities overlooked by the reformers. The crux of the matter consists in two

issues: the definite vagueness and obscurity of the rules for the "new system" and the "ordinary man's" feeling of its inaccessibility.

True, the possibilities for, especially, private enterprise in Poland at present are simply unmatched compared with the past. A person can establish a business of his own within a few days. But, all the more so, the experience of the past three years is becoming a source of social frustration because it shows that many more additional conditions must be met for the enterprise to succeed. The offer of participation in capitalist entrepreneurialism is becoming an empty incentive. And, because the Polish public has retained, speaking in general, a quite substantial dose of common sense, it perceives correctly that, by now, institutional barriers preventing access to the "class of entrepreneurs" or the "class of proprietors" have arisen.

The big-industry working class had been a major base of support for the reforms. Of a certainty, not everyone but, rather, a minority among them were dimly aware that the reform was bound to strike at the socialist "big industry" and thereby affect them as well. My impression is that the general public was aware of this possibility at the outset of the reforms. This created and continues to create a syndrome of "troubled awareness." On the one hand, people are aware that the new rules are necessary, or "logical," as the saying goes, and are a promise of the future, but, on the other hand, they sense that the introduction of these rules radically threatens their own social status, their own interests.

What is more, it seems to me that the reformers themselves have also been aware of this equivocal situation of the groups forming the strong political base of support for the institutional reforms. What then was missing?

Well, I perceive this shortcoming to exist in the field of mentality and politics. The assumption of an "automatic" market mechanism is not proving itself, and, instead, the political system is ineffectively mobilizing people and cannot include them effectively in the "new system."

The recent strikes prompt the conclusion that the shortcomings consist in, first, an inadequate transmission of knowledge and information and inadequate communication, especially between "the authorities" and "the society," and, second, in the absence of an explicit, institutional access to the "new system." The only proposal for an institutional inclusion of "ordinary people" in the new economic system is J. Lewandowski's and J. Szomburg's "mass privatization" concept. But implementing this concept is meeting with growing problems. What is more, the new government, too, is, so to speak, "intransigent" about refusing to communicate with the public, to provide explanations and information about the problems and aims of the reforms, which complicates the matter extraordinarily.

At the same time, it appears that mass privatization alone is too little. It also is necessary to develop institutional methods for promoting private enterprise. The privatization process so far has been insufficiently clear or socially open, so that at times it prompts fantastic rumors and engenders feelings of threat and frustration. Many people, including those who realize that only the privatization of the state Molochs can revive the economy, are prone to protest against that privatization and, on occasion, accuse the ministers of "theft." In that domain, an institutional regulation appears absolutely necessary. One could consider, for example, "privatization offices" or local privatization institutions. Last, the still unused foreign credits should be utilized to promote the growth of small businesses. Here a requirement is complete and readily accessible information and clear and legally, firmly protected rules.

But this still requires a different educational-informational infrastructure. So far, no one in Poland—neither the government, which is reforming the country nor the trade unions, headed by "the mother" of reforms, Solidarity, which participate in this process—has even attempted to create a system of instant economic education or even to provide economic and marketing consultancy accessible to the "common man." The establishment of such "advisory" institutions could help people to establish businesses of their own instead of striking.

It seems to me that these deficiencies are making themselves felt and will become ever more tangible, especially once the existing rules for the establishment of new private businesses become stiffened. And they have to be "stiffened" because competition is becoming greater. These shortcomings of the reforms, which still are not considered in the policies of the reforming social system, are becoming a real threat to the reforms.

Hence, it also seems to me that Leszek Balcerowicz's diagnosis of the situation is not correct, regardless of whether he is partially in the right, because, in reality, various groups of politicians are acting in a totally irresponsible manner, scarcely understanding the realities or refusing to understand them. And, indeed, we all still have the habits acquired under the previous system, and our "troubled awareness" is nostalgic for the old tried and tested methods. But, defining the situation from this standpoint and making it the basis for practical measures could only harm the cause of the reforms for it seems to me that the most important thing at present is to create a sociological infrastructure for the free-market reforms.

* ROSSIYA Claim of 'Polonization' Reported

93EP0157B Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
6 Jan 93 p 7

[Article by S.P.: "ROSSIYA: Polish Priests are Polonizing Belarus"]

[Text] The Council for Religion operating under the Belarus Government has officially requested the Vatican to recall all of the Polish priests assigned to Belarus and

replace them with clergymen of some other nationality, according to ROSSIYA, a Moscow weekly.

Many Polish priests "are devoting a considerable part of their time to serving politics rather than God," ROSSIYA claims. They hang the national flags and the emblem of Poland in churches, and, "in their missionary activities, they call for disobedience of Belarus laws and incite people to lawless actions." Further, ROSSIYA states, they say Masses in the Polish language and teach children the catechism in that language.

The weekly repeats these views after they had been broadly presented at a recent press conference in Minsk by the chief of the Belarus KGB, Eduard Szirkovski. According to Szirkovski, the Roman Catholic Church as such is no threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Belarus. It is impermissible, however, he said, to exploit religion for political purposes.

Of a similar opinion is the chairman of the Council for Religion in Belarus, Aleksey Zhiskiy, who admitted that at present there indeed exists the problem of an "artificial Polonization of the population of Belarus."

To counteract these dangers, ROSSIYA added, the authorities in Minsk have already asked the papal nuncio in Moscow four times not to assign Polish priests to Belarus. The matter was also discussed with Polish authorities, but it progressed no further than diplomatic promises. "For this very reason," the weekly stated, "there is growing belief within government circles in Belarus in the necessity of a forced deportation of priests who arrived in the Republic in response to private invitations and are working in the local Roman Catholic churches. Under Belarus law, foreign nationals who lack permanent visas are not allowed to hold jobs on the territory of the Republic."

The weekly also referred to an article in a government newspaper (its title was not given) discussing disputed territorial problems between Poland and Belarus, as well as ethnic conflicts in Poland's Bialystok region. In ROSSIYA's opinion, the purpose of the article was clear and concerned warning that, unless Warsaw ceases to promote the Polonization of the population of Belarus, the card of the large ethnic Belorussian minority in Poland will be played. In a prefatory paragraph, ROSSIYA commented that the artificial Polonization of the population of the Republic of Belarus may "threaten Poland's territorial integrity."

* Managers' Points of View, Concerns Described

* Views on Economic Development

93EP0160A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND MARKET supplement) in Polish 14 Jan 93 p II

[Article by Piotr Aleksandrowicz: "Ills Compounded: Recession, Taxes, Inflation, Government," under the rubric "Social Research Center Poll for RZECZPOSPOLITA—Managers Talk About Themselves and Their Firms"]

[Excerpts] On being commissioned for the second time by RZECZPOSPOLITA, the Social Research Center, in

December 1992, polled a group of more than 500 managers and deputy managers of Polish enterprises.

This time the poll findings are presented differently. Below we discuss the principal findings, and, in one of the next issues of RZECZPOSPOLITA, in an article by Dr. Janusz Czapinski, we shall focus on questions concerning the morale of managers and the satisfaction they derive from various aspects of life.

In addition, detailed answers to certain questions shall be published within the next few weeks under the rubric "Managers Talk About Themselves." [passage omitted]

How Companies Will Prosper

The expectations for the next six months are somewhat different from what they were half a year ago. The changes in opinions are particularly marked as regards the prices of manufactured goods and services, production costs, and the tax burden. In all of these cases, managers expect increases. Thus, by now, three-fourths of the respondents (compared with 66 percent last June) believe that production costs will rise, and more than two-thirds (compared with fewer than 50 percent previously) believe that prices will rise, while as many as 86 percent (compared with 65 percent last June) expect higher taxes.

Watching the economic situation and the intentions and decisions of the government and the parliament, managers rationally expect higher inflation and higher taxes. The belief that taxes will increase is common, and only a close scrutiny of the findings will show that this belief is somewhat more frequently voiced by the managers of small and private companies.

There is no doubt that, even though the economic climate is generally viewed with moderation, basically it is not conducive to the growth of enterprises.

Both the variability of regulations and the size of the tax burden ranked high on the list of problems of greatest concern to the managers. [passage omitted]

Do you expect major changes in the principal factors affecting your company during the next six months?

	Increase		Decline	
	December	June	December	June
Earning capacity	24	24	39	35
Sales	40	36	33	32
Production cost	78	66	8	14
Employment	17	13	40	40
Competition	53	52	9	7
Taxes and other obligations	86	65	3	4
Problems with getting paid by your debtors	54	48	4	6
Prices of your goods and services	29	24	10	9
Problems with paying your debts	67	50	5	7

"What Worries Me Most"

We asked enterprise managers to tell us about their biggest worries when they think of themselves and their enterprises. The question was open, meaning that each respondent was to mention not more than three causes, none of which was suggested to him.

Most often mentioned were the problems associated with operating the enterprise (40 percent), which does not make it possible to define clearly which factor is basically the most worrisome. The respondents mentioned a decline in the volume of sales, a lack of reserves and capital, the fear of bankruptcy, a lack of markets, and competition. That was especially mentioned by the managers of the state companies with the biggest employment (but not the biggest sales volume). It could thus be concluded that internal problems predominate at enterprises whose structure and employment are not adapted to the present. This indicates that changes at state enterprises must be radical because, otherwise, three years after the market economy was launched, they will continue to face the same problems, largely due to the past.

Ranked second (also by 40 percent of the respondents) was the economic situation; this category could be described by rather macroeconomic terms such as decline in demand, stagnation, unemployment, chaos, recession, and so forth. This more often worried the younger managers and the executives of construction companies, and it generally concerned smaller enterprises. Thus, while at large companies the principal worry is the weakness of their own situation, at smaller companies it is the external situation. It is readily conceivable that changes in that situation will cause more problems to, or even bankruptcy of, smaller companies than to large state-owned companies. In developed market economies, macroeconomic factors affect the fate of private enterprises to a much greater extent than in Poland, and this group certainly exists in such a situation.

Next to the above general factors, the respondents (31 percent) mentioned inflation and higher costs, which affect somewhat more keenly retailers than producers.

Another vexation is the size of the taxes and the absorbent budget "sponge" (28 percent of the respondents), and here, too, the managers of private companies, and especially their owners, complain somewhat more often, which is interesting in that the reservations expressed regarding the question about taxes were relatively less strong. It appears that, in this respect, private companies can be divided into two groups: those that cope with their taxes in one way or another (perhaps by curtailing their profits), and those to which tax obligations are a matter of life or death. The managers also firmly believe that smaller private companies can be more readily discriminated against by the authorities.

As for economic policy, 17 percent of the respondents worried about it (absence of any policy, a recession-promoting policy, absence of growth concepts). The heads of state companies most often viewed the government and the authorities as the causes of their problems. In contrast, rather surprisingly, only 5 percent of the respondents complained about the banking system (payment arrears, poor banking services, outdated facilities), and fewer than 4 percent complained about incompetence of government officials (mess, complications, corruption, delays). It appears that, although the operations of the banks and government officials, including the internal revenue service, are often criticized, basically they are not the greatest problem faced by managers.

The Managers and the Remaining Public

Economic performance in the past 12 months was evaluated more favorably than last June, but still not well. Currently, 12 percent of the respondents perceive an improvement in that performance (compared with 6 percent last June), while 51 percent (versus 69 percent last June) view it as worse. And, while last June the

answers of the managers were of the same tenor as those of all other adult Poles, at present they, and especially the heads of private companies, are somewhat more optimistically disposed in viewing the past. However, these differences are not significant; it can be seen that this situation is affecting everyone more or less uniformly, although it seems that cooperatives are especially susceptible to it.

Compared with last June, assessments by heads of large enterprises as well as of private companies have improved.

The next question concerned expectations for next year. A total of 17 percent of respondents believe the situation will improve next year, and 41 percent believe it will get worse. Last June, their views were less polarized, and the proportion of the undecided was higher.

Compared with the general public, the proportions of both optimists and pessimists among the executives are somewhat higher; the tendency to view the future more favorably clearly diminishes with rising age as well as with growing sales volume: The heads of larger companies are more skeptical. [passage omitted]

How do you think the situation in Poland will change in the next 12 months?

	(In percent)			
	Adult Poles ¹		Managers	
	Jun 1992	Dec 1992	Jun 1992	Dec 1992
It will improve	15	17	17	15
It will stay the same	23	25	32	27
It will grow worse	38	41	37	46
It is hard to say	24	17	15	13

¹Population sample polled by Demoskop

Managers and Inflation

In the last few weeks of 1992, a definite increase in inflationary expectations could be observed. In mid-December, barely 6 percent of Poles expected that the pace of inflation in 1993 would be less than 33 percent—that is, within the government's assumptions—while 45 percent thought it would be higher (33 to 50 percent)—that is, at a level higher than planned but not higher than in 1992. On the other hand, 49 percent of the respondents thought that inflation in 1993 would be higher than it was in 1992.

When asked the same question, only 5 percent of the managers thought inflation would be lower than the planned 33 percent; 52 percent thought it would be at a level somewhere between 1992 and that planned for 1993; and 43 percent thought it would rise above a level of 50 percent, close to that recorded for 1992. [passage omitted]

The Bottom Line or Market Share?

The seemingly obvious question asked of the managers—what they thought about the growth prospects of their companies—was answered positively by 92 percent of the respondents. This proportion was lower than

average only in the group of cooperatives (83 percent), service companies (86 percent), and enterprises managed by women (84 percent) or lessees (89 percent).

Thus, the differences are not significant, and a natural aspiration to expand the company is reflected in the answers of the managers. Concerning another question, which was asked last June, the answers showed that nearly every fourth manager prefers to stick to tried and tested approaches, and only 11 percent adopted the strategy of passively enduring the competition; therefore, the proportion of managers preferring a passive response was also low.

The problem begins when the question of how to expand has to be answered.

A classic dilemma for a company CEO is whether to stress the bottom line or market share. Where the bottom line matters most, there the strategy is oriented to preserve and augment profits, to satisfy the expectations of shareholders, and to remain competitive on the capital market. It is claimed that this bottom-line motive matters relatively more in the United States and in British economies. But, where the long-range interest matters more, and also among companies new to the market, the strategy is chiefly to expand market share

and improve competitiveness of given products and services on the market. It is believed that this latter strategy is preferred by Japanese, Korean, and, partially, German companies. Of course, this division is not that clear and explicit, and, in practice, the management of each company must determine its own objectives, depending on the market situation, the company's position, the demand for capital, the business cycle, and so forth. Moreover, no company can give up on profits in its struggle for a market share.

In East Europe, on the other hand, allowance should be made for the fact that, for years, quantitative indicators (output and hence also market share) used to dominate the assessment of enterprise performance, while qualitative indicators (profits) were disregarded.

At present, both strategies have their supporters among an overwhelming majority of Polish company managers, but more (61 percent) prefer augmenting market share.

However, a thorough analysis of the answers shows that the matter is not that simple. As it turns out, it is the state enterprises that are more often concerned with the bottom line, and private companies more often concerned with augmenting their market share. Although the differences are not too great, it is difficult to disregard them. It thus turns out that state-owned companies have started to be concerned with achieving financial success—perhaps their difficult situation prompts them to view such success as especially desirable—whereas private companies are not as bottom line-centered as claimed by the opponents of that 19th-century version of capitalism that is supposedly rampant in our country.

Among both sole and majority owners of companies, the proportion of those focusing on gaining a market share is higher than in any other group and exceeds two-thirds (68 percent). Thus, the dominant approach is that characteristic of companies entering the market in a period of expansion, and this is what still continues to characterize the private sector.

Another, and somewhat unexpected—especially considering what was said above—conclusion is that the answers are very close to the average (3:2 for supporters of market share), regardless of company size. Actually, it would have been logical for companies with high sales volume to focus more on the bottom line than new companies entering the market, but that is not so. Hence, for a certain group of managers, gaining a greater market share is a very strong motive, regardless of company size.

For accuracy, it also is worth noting that some managers, being influenced by the not always favorable public opinions about the business community, did not want to admit their bottom-line orientation and chose to say that they emphasized market share.

Growth Approach: Exports

Of the 500 companies studied, nearly 30 percent derive part of their revenues from exports of goods and services. Undoubtedly, this finding was influenced by the overrepresentation of larger enterprises, of which one-third to more than one-half (the ones with the highest employment) are exporters.

Among industrial enterprises, this proportion reaches 50 percent, and, for state-owned companies, it definitely exceeds one-half or even two-thirds—in the case of single-person Treasury partnerships.

It appears, however, that smaller companies (10-25 percent of all exporters), civil-law companies, and individually owned and operated companies (14-16 percent) are also doing well as exporters. This could be optimistically interpreted as not a bad result for a country with a relatively—especially potentially—large domestic market. But it is too early for applause.

For it should be borne in mind that, in per capita terms, the level of Polish exports is very low. [passage omitted]

Of the roughly 70 percent of managers whose companies do not engage in exports, one-third are trying to start exporting. This time, too, industrial enterprises, and construction ones as well, often state-owned, predominate, but a large number of smaller and individually operated companies also are in the race. In sum, should their efforts succeed in, say, a year, one-half of the managers would by then operate companies engaging in exports. This is a positive indicator of the anticipated business cycle and growth of foreign trade. This also confirms the idea that the present policy on currency exchange rates does not curtail interest in exports.

Furthermore, some managers appear to be open to forms of activity on the international scene that are relatively new to Poland. One-third of the respondents (more than 160 persons) are thinking of opening foreign branches or establishing enterprises abroad. The proportion of the CEO's of private companies in this group is relatively high. It is characteristic that as many as 42 percent of the owners of private companies are thinking of establishing branches or enterprises abroad, but fewer than 17 percent engage in exports. Not so long ago, Polish investments abroad used to be a rarity and the domain of state foreign trade and a few banks. Nowadays, younger managers at medium-sized companies, especially the construction ones, are interested in such investments.

But there exists a disparity between "thinking" and taking specific steps in the direction of this form of international activity.

It turned out that, of the more than 160 respondents who declared that they were considering establishing a branch or an enterprise abroad, only slightly more than 100 had already made specific attempts in that direction, and barely 38, or fewer than 8 percent of the respondents, are active, or beginning to be active, abroad. It is they who

answered, "Branches opened in Kaliningrad and Kiev," "Operations started in Russia," "We are about to open branches in Germany and Czecho-Slovakia," and so forth. Most often they are major exporters, companies sizable in terms of employment and volume of sales, but by now they are as likely to be private as state ones.

Only a few companies were in the stage we will term the materialization stage (letters of intent, conclusion of agreements, preparation of contracts), and several others were in an advanced stage (negotiations under way, advanced talks).

Few Novel Products

Every sixth company CEO did not, in the last year, add any new product or service to the range offered, and, in every fourth company, the share of new products or services did not exceed 10 percent.

At 29 percent of the companies, new products or services account for 10 to 30 percent of the variety of output or services offered, and, at about every three of 10 companies, they exceed 30 percent.

The findings point to an extensive polarization of the respondents in this respect, and, altogether, they seem favorable from the standpoint of enterprise growth.

Firms offering only a limited range of new products or services (not more than 10 percent) account for 42 percent of the total, while firms placing more emphasis on new products or services account for 58 percent of the total. However, this particular dividing line was adopted at a very low level. [passage omitted]

Private companies emphasize new products and services much more explicitly (63 percent) than state ones (40 percent), as do exporters (64 percent), which confirms that contacts with the world economy make positive adjustments imperative not just for private companies but also for state ones.

Older managers are less flexible as regards introducing new products or services, as are, this being highly important, the managers of companies with substantial sales volume and work forces. Thus, while some revival can be observed in the domain of exports, in the domain of innovations, without which competition cannot be overcome, the situation is poor. [passage omitted]

On Their Own

Among the most frequently chosen possible ways of expanding their companies, the managers named investments with their own capital and internal growth (83 percent). Barely 13 percent are thinking of acquiring a strong domestic or foreign partner, and only 4 percent are thinking of taking over another company. Thus, there is no doubt that the capital market in this country is underdeveloped and that we lack the legal and capital conditions for basing enterprise growth on mergers and takeovers, which are so natural in the economies of the

developed countries. There is probably also a dearth of intellectual preparation and readiness to enter upon such a new development path.

This is particularly disadvantageous, but it also is surprising, given the trend toward privatization, which should promote searches for stronger partners or weaker competitors as well as ownership transformations.

The statement can also be hazarded that, to the extent that many managers do appreciate the importance of diversifying production and distribution (more than 30 percent are exploring other markets in the presence of strong competition), they believe that they should accomplish this on their own.

Combining with a stronger partner is being considered somewhat more often (though still rarely) by the managers of industrial companies (18 percent), firms having the status of state enterprises (30 percent), and companies with the highest sales volumes (19 percent), where, as can be guessed, that possibility is regarded as a last resort rather than as a means of growth.

Thus, generally speaking, if allowance is made for the poor financial condition and capital shortages of Polish companies, the indicators attained show that many managers feel convinced that they will succeed on their own, without capital, in keeping their companies alive. That is an illusory belief.

If your company needs capital, what is it mainly doing about it?

(In percent)	
I sell shares or bonds in my company	7
I apply for a bank loan	51
I postpone paying taxes, insurance premiums, and so forth	6
I recruit funds from friends, family, fellow businessmen	19
I postpone paying my suppliers	19
I postpone repaying loans	4
I do not bother to look for capital because I will not get it anyway	10
My firm at present is not short of capital	25

Growth in Practice—Buying [Privatized Enterprises], but With What?

The manner in which growth objectives are accomplished can be verified to some extent by asking the managers whether they participated in auctions of privatized [state] assets. Fewer than one-fourth of the respondents answered this question affirmatively, and most often they were the heads or owners of private companies, medium-sized enterprises. On the other hand, managers of state-owned and industrial companies tended to stay on the sidelines.

Those who did not buy any such assets or did not participate in the auctions referred most often to

shortage of capital (46 percent), especially the heads of companies with the highest sales volumes, which, as can be seen, do not have to set aside their profits for any such purposes; the second-most-often given reason was the absence of interesting investments (27 percent).

Where To Look For Capital

In cases of capital shortages, one-half of enterprise managers applied for bank loans. One-fifth delayed paying the obligations of their companies, and nearly one-fifth recruited capital from among friends, family, and so forth. Only one out of every 16 tried to issue shares or bonds (this chiefly concerns cooperatives and, to some extent, private companies having the form of joint-stock companies); a similar proportion postponed paying their tax obligations. Even fewer, barely 4 percent, decided to postpone repaying their loans (a choice of two answers was offered).

Those answers display a definite differentiation, depending on company size. At companies with large sales volume, emphasis is placed on applying for loans and delaying payments to suppliers. At state enterprises, especially the larger ones, delaying payments to suppliers and tax payments is a much more frequent practice. At companies with low sales volume, at private companies, and at companies managed by young people, a major source of capital is loans from family and friends, and tax payments are not postponed. [passage omitted]

[Box, p II]

Companies and CEO's

Our December poll of top-level executives was confined to heads of companies employing at least five persons.

Like last June, we assumed that the 500 companies studied should include 100 public-sector firms, including an appropriate group of companies having the status of single-person Treasury partnerships), 100 cooperatives, and 300 private companies.

This last group ultimately included 135 limited-liability partnerships, 27 joint-stock companies, and 75 each of civil-law and individually owned and operated companies.

The second criterion for selection was the nature of operations. GUS [Main Statistical Administration] data served to establish that the overall sample should include 146 industrial companies, 85 construction companies, 156 commercial and food-catering companies, and 113 service establishments. The proportions within the group of private companies were of course different from what they were in the state and cooperative sectors. The study was confined to cities with populations of up to 50,000, those with 50,000-200,000 people, and those with upwards of 200,000. They were selected by drawing lots, and the number of interviews was proportional to the population of a city within a given group.

In general, it can be stated that the findings were correct to within a 5-percent margin of error. For several reasons, the findings of the June and December polls are not fully comparable.

Some figures on company size, the age of managers, and so forth are presented below:

Sales volume: The heads of all of the companies provided tentative figures. Of the 454 companies that disclosed sales volumes, 77 reported sales of up to 2.13 billion zlotys [Z]; 130, sales from Z2 billion to Z10 billion; 171, sales from Z10 billion to Z100 billion; and 76, sales above Z100 billion.

Employment: Although the study was supposed to be confined to companies employing at least five persons, it was found to include 15 or so companies employing three or four persons each. Especially in the smaller cities, the pollsters had problems finding companies meeting this criterion and the criterion of the nature of operations. A total of 175 companies employed from five to 20 persons each; 139, from 21 to 100 persons; 129, from 101 to 500 persons; and 148, more than 500 persons.

Sex: The executives polled included 82 women and 419 men—which was the same proportion as in the June 1991 [as published] poll.

Age: The age groups of the respondents were: Up to 30 years, 42 persons; 31 to 40 years, 170 persons; 41 to 50 years, 201 persons; and upward of 50 years, 91 persons. Thus, two out of every five executives were not older than 40.

Status of ownership: Of the respondents, one-fourth (30 persons) are sole or majority owners of their companies, one-third (177 persons) own shares in their companies, and one-third (also 177) own no share in their companies. The group includes 18 lessees.

Companies with sole or majority owners generally have sales volumes of up to Z10 billion (although every 10th such company has a sales volume exceeding Z100 billion), and they usually employ 20 persons, on the average, with a maximum of 100 employees. Generally such owners are 30 to 50 years old and manage commercial or industrial companies or service establishments.

As for the executives who own no share in the companies they manage, they are mostly the heads of state-owned industrial firms with sales volumes exceeding Z10 billion and employing more than 100 persons each. The remainder, one-fourth, work for private companies. Thus, a group of "hired" managers has arisen. They are often more than 40 years old and more often female than in the case of owners-managers.

It is interesting that three-fourths of the managers of cooperatives are their co-owners, as well. Nevertheless, cooperatives seem to be in the worst situation, and their chairmen are less optimistic than other managers.

Siting: One-half of the companies are sited in cities with populations of more than 200,000.

Nature of operations: The companies polled consisted of 150 industrial, 83 construction, and 141 commercial companies, along with 120 service establishments and a few others.

* Managers as Social Group

93EP0164B Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND MARKET supplement) in Polish 15 Jan 93 p II

[Article by Janusz Czapinski: "The Pleasures and Frustrations of Being a Business Executive," under the rubric "Social Research Center Poll for RZECZPOSPOLITA"]

[Excerpts] More than 500 enterprise owners, directors, chairmen, and deputy directors and chairmen were asked how satisfied they were with 15 different, more or less personal, aspects of their lives. We thus wanted to obtain a rough picture of the morale of Polish executives, of their pleasures and frustrations, and of the subjective advantages and disadvantages of their special status due to the transformations of the economy. This is at the same time an investigation of the psychological sense of identity and internal differentiation of a major component of the nascent middle class in our country.

Managerial Optimism

As a group, they differ most from Poland's remaining adult population in the degree of their satisfaction with the financial situation of their families (three out of every four were satisfied, compared with every fourth average Pole); job satisfaction (nine out of every 10 are satisfied, compared with two-thirds of the average Poles); state of personal health and housing conditions (eight out of every 10 are satisfied, compared with two-thirds of the Polish population as a whole). Likewise, these executives are somewhat more satisfied with the domestic situation and their children and marriage. A comparison with the findings of other recent polls also warrants assuming that, among managers, there are twice as many people confident in their future prospects than among the general public. It looks like they are really successful people. [passage omitted]

Is the Pursuit of a Career Destructive to Family Life?

Satisfaction with the family (children, wife) among the managers, somewhat higher than that shown by a poll of the general public, may be surprising [in view of the stress to which executives are subject, as discussed in the omitted passages]. A November 1992 poll showed that, for a group of individuals other than managers, but with an equally high status, the relationship with life partners became significantly impaired within six months. (In that group, the proportion of those with a happy conjugal life dropped to 84 from 92 percent.) We linked that to a growing commitment of time and energy to professional matters at the expense of family life. But, with the managers, it turned out suddenly that people who

undoubtedly devote more of their time to work than most others are satisfied with their marriage and children even more than the average citizen. The explanation of this discrepancy is simple: Men generally derive more satisfaction from conjugal life than women and feel less responsible for their children, and, in our sample, there were five times as many male executives as female ones (compared with equal representation of both sexes in the November poll of people with high economic and social status). [passage omitted]

No Regrets

Because a managerial career yields more satisfaction than frustration, it is not surprising that two-thirds of our respondents would have chosen the same career if they had to start all over again. Those who are most successful financially regret their choice the least. Of greater interest is the fact that mode of ownership counts more than income: As many as one-half of directors of cooperatives would like to change their careers, compared with only every fifth representative of the private sector and every third manager of a state enterprise, with more women feeling regretful, but, in this case, too, it was mostly female managers of cooperatives. Apparently the downside of such careers in the form of breakdown of marriages counts more to female executives than possible advantages, such as stronger bonds with children (which might be a consequence of the breakdown of marriages).

The above differences in professional satisfaction depending on the ownership (private, state, or cooperative) sector can be partly attributed to ownership relations. Generally speaking, owners and co-owners, who predominate in the private sector, are more satisfied with their careers than are hired managers and administrators.

Younger managers (up to 40 years old) and those below 50 have the fewest regrets about their career choices. At the same time, doubts about the rightness of one's career choice among 40-year-olds are not exceptional to managers. In psychology, there is the term "the age of resolution," or "the midlife crisis," referring to the tergiversations about evaluating one's life experienced by precisely this age group. That is a period of life when it is not yet too late, which is true enough, for a fundamental change, but the risk of failure in a new career and forfeiting one's previous accomplishments, even if they do not quite meet one's aspirations, is by then enormous.

Breakdown of Career Satisfaction by Sector

The ownership sector to which a company managed by our executives belongs may, however, be decisive to other kinds of career satisfaction. It turns out that, for example, chairmen of cooperatives view their futures the least optimistically, while the CEO's of private companies have the best prospects. Similarly, achieving higher incomes in the cooperative sector is done at the expense

of shorter leisure time, whereas, in the state sector, higher incomes are coupled to increased satisfaction from leisure-time activities, and, in the private sector, the size of incomes is generally not linked to the amount of leisure time because, in that sector, some people earn a lot of money in a few days, while others arduously augment their profits month after month and devote all of their leisure time to this endeavor. The levels of satisfaction derived from the financial situation of one's family differ accordingly: The greatest satisfaction is derived in the private sector and the smallest in the cooperative sector. But, if we consider the latter dependence more closely, it turns out that this is due to the sector-dependent differences in income. It is simply that those who earn less (and managers of cooperatives do earn less) complain the most about finances. But, regardless of size of income, work in the cooperative sector yields the least satisfaction (while work in the private sector is the most satisfying) and results in the least feeling of having accomplished something in life. Once again, it is the executives of private companies who are the most satisfied with their jobs and life's accomplishments.

Another sector-related difference is satisfaction with housing conditions, but only among female managers. Female directors of state enterprises complain most often about their housing conditions, and female directors of private enterprises least often.

On the other hand, sector-related differences concerning prospects for the future apply chiefly to men: Regardless of their personal affluence, the heads of private companies view their personal futures most favorably and the chairmen of cooperatives least favorably. Viewing one's prospects depending on the ownership sector also hinges on a company's sales volume. In the state and cooperative sectors, the heads of the enterprises with the highest sales volumes view their personal prospects most favorably, while, conversely, in the private sector, the heads of companies with the highest sales volumes view their futures less optimistically than their colleagues from the two other sectors who manage enterprises with similar sales volumes. This seems to imply that, as managerial personnel view it, large state and cooperative plants in Poland at present are, along with small and medium private enterprises, less threatened; the prospects for big private companies are not good. [passage omitted]

What Is Ours Is Ours

Not all heads of private companies are their owners or co-owners. Some chairmen of cooperatives own shares in their cooperatives, while others do not. It would thus be worthwhile to pose the question of whether private property promotes a subjectively better life. And, indeed, owners and shareholders are more satisfied with their financial situation and personal accomplishments, but this entire effect is due to differentiation in incomes. Hired managers of companies and chairmen of cooperatives earn less than those who manage their own enterprises. Moreover, irrespective of size of income, managing one's own property is personally more satisfying and serves to view the future with rose-colored glasses. In addition, to men at least, this endows them with an added sense of sexual potency while, at the same time,

depriving them of their leisure time. Owners-managers live more intensively. Here the following hypothesis is apt: It is not so much that possession adds wings as that the winged—individuals with greater energy and élan—strive more energetically to achieve professional and economic independence. [passage omitted]

And Yet, They Are Different

Despite the aforementioned marked differences within the group of managers covered by the study as regards personal satisfaction, they cannot be said to be a purely random representative sample of the general public. In their views on coworkers, work, children, and marriage, they are in greater accord than the remaining Polish public. In only one domain of life, they differ mutually more than other Poles: leisure time. Side by side with many workaholics, who devote every free moment to their work, there are also many managers who are great at organizing their leisure time without harm to their work, or, at any rate, to their incomes.

Because this group displays such high overall consonance, it would be worthwhile to proceed still further and ask whether it displays some common deeper pattern of rules defining reciprocal relationships among various aspects of personal satisfaction. A special statistical analysis of the data, termed factorial analysis, basically reveals five such rules. The first is responsible for relations with next of kin; under this rule, satisfaction with home life is accompanied by satisfaction with conjugal life, with children, and with sexual life. It appears that, as in other social groups, this most intimate domain is the one most important to general psychological disposition. It is from this domain that a person derives the greatest strength to contend with the vicissitudes of fate. Other studies indicate that divorce is a most shattering life experience.

The second rule applies to a domain of, in comparison, much smaller importance to the individual: his job. This rule divides the group of our managers into two subgroups: The first consists of persons satisfied with their jobs, finances, personal accomplishments, and educational backgrounds, while the second consists of persons who are dissatisfied with all of these aspects combined.

The third rule concerns matters related to personal health, future, and relations with others. Under this rule, satisfaction with one's personal health is accompanied by satisfaction with relations with coworkers and friends, with the situation in this country, and with personal prospects. This is, as can be seen, a rather opaque rule, although some of the linkages it covers, such as that between health or the nation's condition and personal prospects, are quite understandable.

The rule next in importance, which concerns the personal standard of living, is clearer. According to this rule, people who are more satisfied with the financial situation of their families also enjoy better housing conditions and assess more highly the level of the consumer goods and services available to them.

The last, fifth rule, defines the interrelationship between leisure time, work, and children. It follows from this rule that people with more interesting jobs and better relations with their children are, at the same time, less satisfied with their leisure time. This means that work and children are the principal "thieves" of leisure time in that group. To the general public, this rule does not apply because, to the average Pole, his job does not encroach on his leisure time, and, to be sure, children are a disadvantage, but only to family finances, not to leisure time, which is totally irrelevant to the more affluent group of managers.

But the fact that this particular group derives more satisfaction from career and home life than the public as a whole still does not mean that in Poland we have a psychologically homogeneous group of top-level executives because there still exist marked differences within that group as linked to ownership sector. The mentality of the heads of state companies and cooperatives differs from that of the heads of private companies, and, similarly, the mentality of company owners differs from that of hired managers, but the latter differences are consonant with the spirit of the market economy, to which the guiding idea is private property.

**Percentage of People Satisfied With
Selected Aspects of Life in the
General Population Sample
and the Managerial Sample**

	Nov 1991 ¹	Dec 1992 ²
Financial situation	27	77
Coworkers and friends	91	94
State of health	63	79
Situation in the country	18	22
Housing conditions	66	79
Leisure	64	59
Job	67	88
Children	94	99
Marriage	89	94
Living standards	94	80 ³
Family relations		95
Personal accomplishments		84
Prospects for the future		57
Sexual life		94
Education		90

¹Sopot Social Research Center, 943-member general population sample

²Sopot Social Research Center, 507-member sample of managers

³In the sample group of managers, this question concerned the level of available goods and services

This study was carried out by the Sopot Social Research Center, as commissioned by RZECZPOSPOLITA, on 5-6 December 1992 on a representative 507-member sample of managers.

* Historical Argument Against Reprivatization

93EP0156B Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
12 Jan 93 p 3

[Article by Wojciech Sadurski: "Against Reprivatization"]

[Text] Unlike the broad public discussions of such controversial national issues as abortion, the place of religion in the school, and joining the united—in the future—Europe, the issue of reprivatization has not been widely debated. Its discussion is confined to how and to what extent to reprivatize rather than whether or not to reprivatize. Such an impoverishment of discussion causes, as it were, the opponents of reprivatization—who do exist, after all—to remain unheard, compared with the supporters of returning palaces, apartment buildings, and factories to their former owners (or, more properly speaking, to their offspring).

Yet, it is not at all evident that the introduction of the capitalist system in Poland entails the need to reprivatize assets taken over by the state, even if illegally, as a result of nationalization, the agrarian reform, the appropriation of urban real estate, and so forth. For a free-market economy, the restoration of the mode of ownership existing before actions that can now be considered lawless or unjust is not a prerequisite. Few if any supporters of the free market and respect for private ownership in the United States and Australia believe that land that white settlers took by force or by fraud should be returned to Indian tribes in the United States or aborigines in Australia.

Thus, the postulate of reprivatization, as distinct from privatization, has to be buttressed with arguments other than arguments in favor of the market economy based on private property. Such arguments must be linked to understanding the scope and rationale of private property, of course. The argument that private property is "sacred" or that it is "a natural right" or, too, that it is "inviolable" is the beginning and not the end of discussion.

A Digression on Private Property

Here I will digress a little, so as to anticipate objections from the supporters of reprivatization. If a person needs to know the rationale for private property, that does not mean that he is a foe of private property. It merely means that any human right, whether the right to life or to freedom of speech or to property, must be based on some arguments referring to even more fundamental values.

Thus, wanting to know the rationale for these rights does not imply any intent to undermine them but merely the desire to base them on strong ethical foundations. A law that cannot be based on the moral justification of specific human obligations and rights does not deserve to be called a just law.

Hence, to say that some or other right is "sacred" or "natural" is a rhetorical device serving to emphasize the

great importance of that right but still not providing the rationale for it. The great philosophers who had demanded respect for the right of ownership—St. Thomas Aquinas, Thomas Hobbes, and John Locke—derived the institution of the right of ownership from the usefulness to mankind yielded by this form of disposing of material goods, and did not confine themselves to terming it a “natural” right.

This also applies to those who demand reprivatization on the grounds that private ownership should be “absolute” and “inviolable.” Literally speaking, such a statement makes no sense because private property as well as its particular distribution in one society or another is in itself a consequence of the legal system and not something immanent and existing independently of legal regulations. The legal distribution of an estate in the event of an intestate inheritance, the principles governing the acquisition of ownership through acquisitive prescription (usucaption), tax-law regulations, and hundreds of other legal regulations cause the ownership of material goods to be distributed in specific ways, depending on the society. A change in any of these regulations automatically causes a change in the actual distribution of goods.

The claim that law must respect the inviolability of private property is thus conceptually illogical; law defines the scope and mode of the distribution of property but cannot be based on the postulate of its inviolability. In other words, there is no title to ownership a priori of law or outside of law that has to be, so to speak, respected by law.

Restitution Is Not Always Justified

This perhaps lengthy digression was needed to illustrate the statement that reprivatization, like any other social change, requires an ethical, practical, or some other rationale. What matters more, my aim is to convince the reader that arguments in favor of reprivatization must have the same genesis as those in favor of private property. In other words, the point is whether the rationale for the system of private property also applies to reprivatization.

Let us reject at the outset the temptation to resort to the oversimple argument that unjustly violated rights must always be restored. A moment of reflection suffices to realize that a past act of injustice or lawlessness does not always lead to the conclusion that the violated rights (whether personal or material) must be restored. That is because, in the meantime, circumstances altering the context in which these rights had been originally applicable may have occurred.

That is, I believe, the case with the Amerindian or Australian aboriginal land. The lapse of time, the departure of the individuals who had been unjustly treated, and events occurring after the original unjust expropriation (for example, the fact that persons not responsible for the ancient lawlessness built their lives on the ownership of the land in question) all argue against any

mechanical “restitution.” In criminal law, there is the concept of the statute of limitation and, in civil law, that of usucaption; these concepts are based precisely on the belief that the restoration of once lawlessly disturbed status is not always possible or even just.

Property and Labor

Is there then any substantive rationale for reprivatization that transcends the fundamentally pointless formula that what was once lawlessly seized must be, even after the elapse of a lengthy period of time, restored to the owner? As I showed earlier, such a rationale must be consonant with the rationale for the institution of private property. A traditional philosophical argument in favor of private property is based on the relationship between material goods and human labor. It is the famous argument of the English philosopher John Locke to the effect that man adds value to material goods by dint of his labor. Inasmuch as man has the right to his body, and labor is, as it were, an extension of human hands and human mind, he also has the right to the products of that labor.

Irrespective of the various reservations made by Locke's critics about this concept of the right to private property, what matters to us is that precisely this argument does not apply to reprivatization: Not because the original owners benefited from their property, thanks to their personal ingenuity or labor, but because this argument is not adequate to justify the rights of the offspring and heirs of the owners. The argument for “linking labor to material goods” is hardly persuasive, if only because it cannot justify the transfer of property to others, and especially the institution of inheritance.

A Foundation of Stability

Another and better argument in favor of private property can be basically formulated as follows: A man who owns some property, such as a house, land, or an object, in a sense organizes his life around that property. This is a foundation of the stability of the life of the individual, the justified belief that, in that life, tomorrow will be an extension of today, and the day after tomorrow will be an extension of tomorrow—in short, the belief in continuity.

Life in a society in which there does not exist at least some modicum of certainty about the permanence of the basic determinants of human life (which, after all, also include property) would be intolerable. In such a society, one simply could not plan one's life or build expectations as to the factors determining our future actions and decisions.

I ask the reader to pardon these generalizations, but I think that such a rationale for private property is acceptable to very many people. The point is that such a rationale provides no ammunition to supporters of reprivatization. Its very persuasiveness hinges on the uninterrupted preservation of ownership by a given individual. If that individual becomes (justly or unjustly)

deprived of his title of ownership, with time it becomes natural for him to build his life anew in the absence of the premise that the object expropriated still belongs to him.

In particular, the above rationale does not apply to the restitution of property to the offspring of the unjustly expropriated individual. Those offspring create—to an incomparably greater extent than the expropriated owner—their own vision of life on the basis of assumptions that do not include the belief that they can dispose of the property in question.

A Different Identity

It thus cannot be said that the property seized from their parents and grandparents is part of that actual sense of personal identity on whose basis an individual builds his plans. For, while property (in the best and most convincing rationale for it) is a factor in the sense of personal identity, serving to link yesterday to tomorrow, that rationale argues against expropriation but not in favor of the restitution of property years later, especially to people other than those who had in their time been deprived of it.

Of course, not all supporters of privatization refer to the moral argument of personal identity and the importance of continuity in human expectations. Often, and perhaps most often, the decisive arguments are of a utilitarian nature: The best use of property is made when control over its utilization is based on private ownership. There is a great deal of sense to this argument, which is based on the commonsensical observation that no one takes better care of a thing than its owner.

The ultimate implications of this argument in favor of private property do not matter here. The economic theory of the so-called public wealth argues that private ownership of certain facilities whose utilization cannot be individually controlled is ipso facto a disincentive to their efficient utilization. What matters here is that, while the utilitarian argument is the principal argument in favor of private property, this is also an argument not in favor of reprivatization but in favor of a privatization assuring the "allocation" of property to those who can utilize it best—and they do not have to be the offspring of former owners.

* Demographic Study: Fewer Births, More Illness

93EP0157A Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA* in Polish
8 Jan 93 p 2

[Article by Renata Wrobel: "A Young but Ailing Society: Poles in the Eyes of Demographers"]

[Text] Until the mid-1980's, Poland was one of the countries with a rapidly growing population. In the past few years, this growth rate has been steadily declining, and, in 1991 and 1992, it fell to the level of 0.3 percent annually—the lowest ever in the entire postwar period. Natural population increase—that is, the difference

between the number of births (which is decreasing) and the number of deaths (which is steadily rising)—is declining. The so-called simple reproduction is no longer present: The "generation of mothers" is less numerous than the "generation of daughters." But, demographers contend, we are not being threatened by a population decrease.

According to GUS [Main Statistical Administration] figures, toward the end of 1992, Poland had a population of more than 38,420,000. Between January and December, 516,000 children were born and 392,000 people died. The indicator of natural increase amounted to 3.3 per 1,000 capita (3.7 in 1991). There were 223,000 marriages and 30,000 divorces. We are a young society: Our mean age is 33.

Fewer Neonates

The current demographic nadir should be "overcome" within two or three years, according to Lucyna Nowak, deputy director of the Department of Social and Demographic Research, GUS. Nowadays, the mothers are usually the women from the "nadir" of the 1960's, which will soon change. Demographers believe that the anti-abortion law, too, will result in increasing the number of births, but they are unable to estimate the scale of that trend.

As ensues from the information available to GUS, the decline (by 30,000 in 1992) in the number of neonates cannot be attributed to an increased number of abortions. On the contrary, abortions have been decreasing in recent years. In 1970, 150,000 legal abortions were performed; in 1988, 103,000; in 1990, nearly 60,000; and, in 1991, 31,000 (of which 13,500 were in hospitals).

More Deaths

The nearly steady increase in the number of deaths is disturbing, even though in 1992 there were 12,000 fewer than in the preceding year. The reasons include the poor health of Poles, environmental pollution, improper diet, and addictive habits. More than one-half of the deaths were due to circulatory diseases, followed by cancer (19 percent), and accidents, injuries, and poisoning (8 percent). The number of deaths of males in the prime of life, 30 to 60 years old, has risen dramatically. In this respect, Lucyna Nowak claims, we have regressed to 40 years ago.

Since the 1970's, the average lifespan has been getting shorter. As recently as in 1988, the statistical Polish neonate had a chance to live for 67.2 years if a boy or 75.7 years if a girl. In 1991, the corresponding figures were 66.1 and 75.3 years. It is estimated that they will decline still further in 1992. In this respect, we are an inglorious exception compared with a majority of the European countries.

The only "point of light" is the decline in infant mortality. In 1992, it amounted to 14 per 1,000 newborns, compared with 15 per 1,000 in the preceding year.

(Compared with the statistics for other countries, our data are 3-3.5 points lower.) In Poland, the category of "birth incapable of living" continues to be employed, contrary to the recommendations of the World Health Organization. Despite its evident improvement, our indicator of infant mortality still remains (after the data are standardized) more than three times as high as in, for example, Scandinavia.

Marriages and Divorces

For every 100 Polish males, there are 105 females (108 in cities, 100 in the countryside). Within some age groups, however, the proportions differ. Demographers are disturbed by the considerable "deficit" of women up to age 40 in the countryside, especially in the eastern regions. They warn that this may threaten the depopulation of certain areas.

The decline (by 10,000 in 1992) in the number of marriages is due solely to changes in age structure:

Representatives of the population nadir of 20-odd years ago are now getting married. The number of divorces also has declined (by 4,000): Of every 200 existing marriages, five have collapsed.

What is Awaiting Us

According to the most likely forecast of GUS, by the end of this century, Poland's population will exceed 39.5 million, and, by 2010, it will come close to 41 million. Until the year 2000, the increase in able-bodied population will be very rapid. Given the extensive unemployment, this may lead to "incalculable consequences," according to Director Nowak.

Unlike most other European countries, we are not being threatened by population aging. Our demographic "challenges" are different: the worsening state of the health of Poles and the anticipated surge in the influx of immigrants from the East.

*** Reopening of Hungarian University in Cluj Urged**

93CH0313A Bucharest ROMANIAI MAGYAR SZO in Hungarian 30 Dec 92 p 5

[Statement issued by the Bolyai Society: "Petition Related To Hungarian-Language Bolyai University"]

[Text]

I.

The Bolyai Society, which was founded in 1990 for the purpose of fighting for the modern and legal revival of the Hungarian-language university system that was methodically and illegally destroyed by the communist dictatorship, requests Romania's high-level authorities, and you personally, to have a government resolution issued for fulfilling the unanimous wish of Romania's Hungarian population to reopen Bolyai University of Kolozsvár [Cluj], together with its auxiliary campuses in Marosvásárhely and, according to need, perhaps in other cities.

II.

Allow us to briefly outline the main past events in Romania's Hungarian-language university instruction:

- The Transylvanian Hungarian-language university system has a tradition of more than four centuries.
- The Gyulafehérvár proclamation of union guaranteed the right of minorities to maintain their own state-financed educational institutions, from preschool to university.
- The pre-World War II governments were unwilling to fulfill the expectations of Transylvania's Hungarian population regarding higher education, resulting in great disappointment and harm to Romania's Hungarian culture.
- In 1945, King Michael I approved in his order 407 the foundation of a Hungarian-language university in Kolozsvár with four colleges (liberal arts, law and economy, natural sciences, and medicine). The university was named "Bolyai University of Kolozsvár" after Farkas Bolyai and Janos Bolyai, two great Transylvanian mathematicians. Subsequently, because of a lack of space, the College of Medicine was moved to Marosvásárhely. At the same time, Hungarian-language sections were established in Kolozsvár in the music, fine arts, and theater departments, and in the Agricultural Institute and the College of Engineering. Subsequently, the Institute of Theater was moved to Marosvásárhely.
- With the communist takeover, these institutions began to disintegrate, gradually lost their autonomy and were liquidated. The situation of Hungarian-language university instruction became catastrophic.

This process in 1952 began with the abolition of Hungarian-language lectures and courses at the College of Engineering, culminating in Bolyai University's loss of autonomy and its forced merger with local Babes University.

The provisions of the merger's by-laws were not respected within Babes-Bolyai University.

Hungarian-language instruction was gradually stifled, even after the December 1989 events, an example being the forced retirement of certain Hungarian university professors at the Medical and Pharmaceutical University of Marosvásárhely. It is apparent that the process of stifling Hungarian-language university instruction is continuing.

After the December 1989 revolution, the Hungarian minority believed that there would be a fundamental change in dealing with the minority problem (including the Hungarian-language education system) and that these changes would take place in the spirit of international agreements which Romania also signed. (The Universal Proclamation of Human Rights, the UNESCO agreement regarding the fight against obvious discrimination in education, the Helsinki Accord's Closing Statement, the closing documents of the Madrid Talks, the documents of the CSCE talks in Copenhagen regarding the human scope, the documents of the Krakow Symposium regarding cultural traditions, the Paris Charta For A New Europe, the documents approved by experts on minority affairs at the 1991 CSCE talks in Geneva.) Accordingly, we proposed practical solutions regarding the reopening of Bolyai University, which had a wide range of activities, and our petition was signed by more than 200,000 Romanian-Hungarian citizens.

After the formation of the first legal Romanian Government, the Bolyai Society repeatedly brought up the request of the Hungarian minority regarding the revival of the autonomous native-language university system; this request was also supported by petitions submitted by the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Gyulafehérvár, the Roman Catholic Diocese of Nagyvárad, the Roman Catholic Diocese of Szatmárnémeti, the Roman Catholic Diocese of Temesvár, the Transylvanian Calvinist Reformed Diocese, and the Evangelical-Lutheran Diocese of Romania. They are the following:

- on 4 April 1991, leaders of the churches mentioned submitted a petition to Romania's president, and then conveyed their request again orally at the presidential audience on 2 May 1991;
- on 18 July 1991, the historical Hungarian-language churches of Transylvania presented their modification proposals primarily concerning Section II, Article 32 of the draft constitution, and forwarded them to Romania's Constitutional Assembly;
- on 17 January 1992, the historical Hungarian-language churches of Transylvania and the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania submitted a memorial

to the Romanian Government, the Ministry of Education and Science and the State Secretary of Church Affairs regarding the bill on churches and religious freedom and the education bill;

- our petition, dated 11 June 1992, included the modification proposals of Hungarian-language churches of Transylvania regarding the education bill that was prepared by parliament's Special Committee on Education, Science, Youth, and Sport and was forwarded to the Senate, the House, the Ministry of Education and Science, and the State Secretary of Church Affairs.

Let it be noted that a three-member delegation of the Bolyai Society (Dr. Sandor Balazs, Dr. Andras Bodor, and Dezso Jenei, certificated engineer) was called on 8 August 1991 for an audience by Minister of Education of Science Dr. Stefan Gheorghe. The delegates of our society used this opportunity to restate our request regarding the reestablishment of the Hungarian-language university system, and submitted a written statement to this effect, together with copies of the earlier four memorials (16 January 1990, 27 March 1990, 10 April 1990, 5 May 1990).

We are sorry to say that we received no reply whatsoever to these petitions.

III.

We mention the following in support of our proposals:

- The native-language university system is a sine qua non condition for Hungarians in Romania at the end of this millennium to preserve their cultural and ethnic identity.
- The preservation and development of Hungarian culture in Romania enriches the country's culture, and the Hungarian minority strives for recognition of this right as it was promised (mentioned above) by the Romanian nation in its proclamation announcing the union of Romania and Transylvania. Relinquishing this right would be a historical mistake on our part, and the absence of legal guarantees for this right would be tantamount to our cultural genocide.
- Because of the Hungarian population's national percentage ratio and the fact that—just as Romanians—it contributes to the state, its request to have a state-subsidized educational system is justified; in view of the fact that the state maintains more than 40 institutions of higher learning, the 1.7-million strong Hungarian population of Romania has the right to the institutional system which we proposed and which we requested in our earlier petitions.
- Under the present circumstances, there are no guarantees for Hungarian youth in Romania even to study at the university level in proportionate numbers (the Hungarian population constitutes 7 percent of the country's population, but the ratio of Hungarian students is only 3.5 percent).

—On the one hand, the reason for the exodus of Hungarian intellectuals from Romania is that secondary education sorely lacks didactic cadres and, on the other hand, it leads to the point where a revival of Transylvania's Hungarian culture becomes impossible.

—The absence of a complete Hungarian-language university system eradicates in our youth the motivation to study in Hungarian-language high schools (and, in the next phase, the motivation to study in Hungarian-language elementary schools), with the reasoning that those who did not study in Romanian-language high schools will at a disadvantage in the future be during their higher education.

—An efficient practice exists in West Europe that could, in this respect, serve as a model (let us only refer to the university system of the approximately 300,000 Swedes in Finland or to the universities of Spain's minorities—Basks, Catalans, and Galegs—which guarantee native-language higher education for them). Without doubt, our state's integration into the Western value system requires an adaptation to the minority rights that exist there, including the approximation of minority educational systems that exist there, with special consideration given to the numerical components, traditions, and endeavors of Romania's minorities.

—The closing documents of the CSCE talks in Copenhagen (1990) and Geneva (1991) provide the right for national minorities to receive an education in their native languages, to maintain their own cultural, educational, and religious institutions, without the state hindering their operation.

—The European Charta of Regional and Minority Languages provides guarantees for education in these languages as well as the necessary financial means.

—If the state would guarantee to create the necessary conditions for the Hungarian population to exercise its right to a complete native-language educational system, and if that guarantee would become concrete by maintaining a state-financed Hungarian-language university, then all this would contribute to the feeling of Hungarians of Romania that they indeed live in a common country as equal citizens. At the same time, the ability and talent that would serve the development of the country's material and intellectual civilization would be freed, and we would be making long strides toward resolving the tensions between the ethnic groups and would be truly embarking on the road toward true democracy.

IV.

We must stress that

- a culture with thousand-year-old traditions cannot be maintained at the end of the 20th century without our own institutional system—without a system which

would protect cultural traditions and which would assure that this culture is appropriately developed in accordance with the requirements of our times and our own education;

- the development of education in accordance with the will, options, and talents of all minorities would in no way undermine the majority culture; on the contrary, it would mean diversification, enriching the education of the entire country's population on the basis of constructive dialogue;
- the culture of a people or a group of peoples is not limited to language, to native-language literature and theater; a culture that is so limited is not viable in our times; by definition, culture encompasses every projection of human intellectual creation;
- we cannot but disagree with the view that minority higher education must be limited to the training of teachers and actors needed for high schools and schools of theater; a population of almost two million is capable of, and has the right to, an all-encompassing education (arts, sciences, religion, technical training, and creating);
- experience with shared [Romanian-Hungarian] universities proves that this kind of institution does not live up to the requirement for developing the Hungarian people's own culture and of assuring the viability and development of this education, because existing limitations put Hungarian teachers and students in the minority, making them unable to express or assert their own identity and personality. Decisions are based on secret ballots by the majority. (We note here that the Senate of Babes-Bolyai University has only four Hungarian instructors, a pro-rector among them and, in the entire university, there is only one Hungarian pro-dean and one department chairman, the latter working at the Department of Hungarian Language and Literature at that);
- cooperation between autonomous and independent institutions would result in greater benefits than the present situation in which one of the parties, in the

shadow of the majority (which as well-meaning as it may be, is still different in terms of culture and frame of mind), cannot implement its own creative initiatives;

- the understanding of concepts in the native language is merely an assurance of thorough learning and is not a hindrance to equipping students with the technical terminology of the country's official language. If this were not the way in which we look at things, then we would have to question the justification for Romanian university instruction conducted in world languages, or the fact that our youths study at universities abroad. The standard for professional qualification is not the language of instruction but the quality of the knowledge that is acquired, and it is precisely the native language which, under the best conditions, is the best guarantee for this;
- it is imperative to learn the state language at the level of both the spoken and technical language; it is a matter of principle and a fundamental responsibility of educational institutions at every level to live up to this expectation.

V.

In accordance with the will of the entire Hungarian minority in Romania, and on the basis of our sacred right to have our entire native-language culture, and in the knowledge that a native-language educational system is a sine qua non condition for this, and referring to the democratic spirit and Christian attitude and mutual respect, we ask respectfully but determinedly that our earlier petitions be responsibly studied and our request that the possibility of a state-financed native-language autonomous university system be studied again, be granted.

Dr. Sandor Balazs, President

(This text was approved at the 17 October 1992 general meeting of the Bolyai Society, and was sent to President Ion Iliescu, Prime Minister Nicolae Vacarolu, and Liviu Malor, minister of education and science.)

*** Deputy Sees Some Hope for Common Future***93CH0303A Bratislava SLOBODNY PIATOK in Czech
31 Dec 92 p 6*

[Article by Milos Zeman, deputy of the Federal Assembly: "Forecast for Year One: We Will See That Deputy and Forecaster Milos Zeman Is a Passionate Advocate of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. Nevertheless, We Are Publishing the Original Text of His Article"]

[Text] The editorial department of SLOBODNY PIATOK requested me to submit an article with the above title to be included in the New Year's Eve edition. I was a little surprised. Historical changes had taken place, which were considered to be so important that they were meant to be the beginning of a new calendar. So far, however, only Christianity succeeded in doing this; not even the French Revolution, for instance, was able to do it. And the assumption that the breakup of a small central European state would start a new calendar is so amusing that it really does belong in a New Year's edition. On the other hand, the adage that one should not make jokes at a funeral is applicable. Therefore, all that is left is to offer Slovak readers what one of the classic Czech humorists, Josef Skvorecky, called "bitter laughter" for their New Year's entertainment.

On television I saw the faces of the Slovak nationalists, rejoicing at the creation of a new state. I saw with my own eyes the faces of the Czech nationalists in front of the Federal Assembly building, rejoicing at the creation of a new, albeit different, state. In both cases, they were the same, insensitive faces. I do not like nationalists. They remind me of a statement made by the Good Soldier Svejk that he was glad that everyone came directly from somewhere. Each of us was born somewhere. We cannot take credit for this, and, therefore, there is also no reason to be proud of it. We can be proud of our work when we look back and see a house that has been built, a field that has been plowed, or a book that has been written. Those who have not done the first, the second, or the third must seek surrogate pride, pride that they come from somewhere. They beat their chests and swear to pride in their nation, without saying what they have done for it. A male gorilla also beats his chest when he wants to gain dominance over a female. Political Neanderthals offer nationalism because they cannot do anything better. However, nationalism is a collective inferiority complex. Nationalism is the ideology of impotence. Let us not hope to achieve something with the help of such an ideology.

Let us assume that we are united at least by the endeavor to reenter Europe. That Europe, according to the Maasticht agreement, will be called the European Union. It will have uniform economic, social, ecologic, foreign, and defense policies. It will have common citizenship and currency. It already has a European parliament. It will have joint transportation, energy, and information networks. Do you really believe that we will become

more visible in this Europe if the high-speed railway is replaced by a narrow-gauge railway along the section running through our territory? Do you perhaps wish our genuine engineer to drive the train along this section? Supranational companies do not ask where their managers come from. They ask what qualifications those managers have. Our increasing Europeanism means an increase in knowledge.

Even if there were a single Czechoslovakia, reentry into Europe would take 20 years. Why should they take us in earlier if it will cost them dearly? And the poorer members of the European Union will have no interest in seeing the regional equalization funds, which serve their purposes, transferred to Central Europe. Thus, we first at least have to catch up with these members. This can be done more easily if there is a broader domestic market, a common economic and social sphere, and if one does not shut oneself up in one's own national ghettos. Even so, it would not be easy. We would have to offer more than solely political democracy and a market economy—which even India has. We would have to offer something to accelerate the process, consisting of investments in the education of our citizens and in their increasing stimulation toward higher performance.

Instead of that, we are separating. It is a game with negative profit, where both sides will lose. We will limit our modest resources even further by having two embassies instead of one in Argentina, by having our own armies, by printing our own bank notes, and by setting up customs offices. Someone will have to pay for all of this, and the someone will be the Czech and the Slovak taxpayer. Our reward will be that there will be one more position for a diplomat in Buenos Aires. And our sick citizens will continue to die because there will not be enough money for dialysis machines.

We have separated, but we were not even asked whether we wanted to do so. Yes, a referendum would cost 100 million Czech korunas [Kcs]. Recently, the purchase of the presidential plane, Challenger, cost us Kcs500 million. Thus, in this Kafkaesque country, we have a presidential plane without a president for the price of five referendums. Perhaps some ridiculous playwright will sit in it, a man who made the citizens of this country into characters in his plays and who fled from the captain's bridge the moment the ship started to sink.

After passing the law on the termination of the CSFR [Czech and Slovak Federal Republic], a small group of delegates from the Slovak National Party unfurled the Slovak flag in front of the bust of Stefanik and sang the song "Hej Slovaci"—incidentally, out of tune. If Stefanik could rise from his grave, he would box their ears. Before the law was passed, the Czech prime minister spoke at Vysehrady and the assembly emotionally sang the St. Wenceslaus chorale—incidentally, out of tune. If Masaryk could rise from his grave, he would box their ears.

Why did we really separate? In my opinion, the primary reason was a crazy economic reform, implemented by a group of semieducated fanatics, who leaned on a doctrine that had been abandoned by the developed world. No amount of deference to specific details could have improved this reform, in the same way that we will not do away with capital punishment by disinfecting the blade of the guillotine. The authors, by chance, came from Prague. However, we will not abolish Pragocentrism by replacing it with Bratislavocentrism. Dominance disappears only when strong, self-governing units are created, which voluntarily delegate to the supranational level those jurisdictions that can be implemented better and more cheaply at that level. Otherwise, the tension will merely be transferred to a different level. We have mutual interests, and, even if we sometimes do not agree with one another, that is no reason to separate, unless a Moravian Republic or an East Slovak Republic is to be created. But I still have not given my forecast for Year One. That forecast is plain and simple. We will be reunited. We will reunite, having become wiser, more humble, and more knowledgeable through the consequences of the breakup, and we will not attempt to order one another about or accuse each other of being the losers. We will reunite in the same way as the sovereign European countries are drawing closer, but we will do it more quickly because, otherwise, we might be left outside the gates of Europe. We will reunite because there is more that unites us than that separates us.

The Latin nations like to quote the saying "*Perdidistis utilitatem calamitatis*"—we have lost the benefit of

disaster. Simulations of the consequences of a breakup did not convince us. We did not have the courage to exchange a nonfunctional federation for a functional union, approaching the European union and anticipating its form. Therefore, we will have to live through a disastrous scenario. When our politicians in both succession states assure us that others were to blame for their errors, when conflicts start to increase, when ambitious demagogues try to interpose waves of hatred between us, let us remember that the government should not change its citizens but that the citizens should change their government.

And do not stone your prophets. If a light comes on on the dashboard of your car, warning you that the oil in the engine is too low, do not ignore it. Sometimes I am afraid that we are led by politicians who, smiling triumphantly, will hit the dashboard with their fist, and, when the light goes out, will tell the public that they have fixed the car. In truth, they will merely destroy the engine. So let us avoid our disasters because one of them could be the last and could be irrevocable.

We wish SLOBODNY PIATOK and its readers a wise and peaceful future.

Milos Zeman

P.S. Especially that Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Saturday, and Sunday also become free.

Macedonia

* Role of Movement of Ecologists of Macedonia

93BA0510A Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in
Macedonian 9 Jan 93 p 16

[Interview with DEM President Josif Tanevski by Vanco Meandziski; place and date not given: "The Time of the Ecologists Is Coming"]

[Text] *The Movement is increasingly establishing itself in society as a new alternative movement for citizens in the struggle for a new, ecological approach in social life, Dr. Tanevski says; noteworthy mobilization of the public in solving ecological problems; intensive international contacts.*

As time goes by, the Movement of Ecologists of Macedonia [DEM] is becoming an increasingly more important public association. For some time now Dr. Josif Tanevski has headed this prominent humane public organization. We talked with the president of the DEM about the situation and the basic trends in this significant public association's further activity.

[Meandziski] For several years you have been an activist, and then also president of the "Survival" Ecological Society and a member of the top leadership of the ecologists' movement. Now, as president of the DEM, how do you assess the situation in this unique and extremely significant public association?

[Tanevski] In view of its activities and its influence on the solution of ecological problems, the DEM now really is an important public organization. The reputation that the DEM has established among the public while advocating the solution of public problems of interest to all citizens is enormous, and it represents an obligation. The DEM is a new movement (it has only existed for three years in an organized form); it is a nonparty, civil organization of people who are united by the love of nature and the desire to live in a healthy and clean environment. I think that the DEM's work is at an increasingly higher level, since, after starting as an opposition movement, it is increasingly establishing itself as a new alternative movement for citizens in the struggle for a new, ecological approach in public life.

Through its societies in the Republic of Macedonia, the Movement is gradually establishing a new attitude on the part of all public institutions in the struggle for a clean environment. In view of the ecological problems that Macedonia has, we think that the DEM's role will be more and more significant during the coming period. The DEM is aware of Macedonia's general political and economic situation, but even in such conditions it is not reconciling itself to any ecological injustices. Consequently, we will be persistent, in view of the support and sympathy that we have from Macedonia's citizens in the consistent implementation of our program.

[Meandziski] In your opinion, in the four years that the Macedonian ecologists have existed and have been active on the public scene, have they succeeded in practice in fulfilling the basic postulates of the lofty ecological idea?

[Tanevski] Macedonian ecologists are initiating the solution of numerous ecological problems in the republic. It is very significant that in addition to pointing out the urgency of specific ecological problems, they have mobilized the public to help solve them and propose solutions for them. With respect to certain ecological problems that are more critical, one cannot speak of enormous successes until conditions visibly improve (Lake Dojran, the Vardar River, and the foundry in Titov Veles). These are more complex problems, however, and time, funds, and a great deal of effort are needed to solve them. Work is progressing on these problems too, however.

We are satisfied that we have witnessed that at many work collectives, thanks to our pressure and our pointing things out, the ecological situation is changing, since our ultimate goal is to ecologize the awareness of all citizens, especially all responsible and professional people in society, so that the problems can be solved more quickly.

At several industrial facilities in Macedonia, the construction or renovation of purification stations is under way: at Heroj Toza Dragovikj, the construction of an enormous purification station is under way, which will reduce the pollution of the Grasnica River that flows into Lake Ohrid; a new purification station is being built at the Godel tannery in Skopje; and at OHIS [Skopje Organic Chemicals Plant] the renovation of a shop for monochloroacetic acid worth 1 million German marks is under way, which will reduce the pollution of underground water. At other industrial facilities as well, concern about environmental protection is at an increasingly higher level, but because of the economic situation, it is still the case that not enough is being invested for a visible improvement in it. In general, we can be satisfied that the goals of our work are being achieved in practice, but, nevertheless, in the future it should be even more significant.

[Meandziski] In its activity to date the DEM, among other things, has achieved abundant cooperation with similar associations in our country and in the world. How is that cooperation proceeding right now, and which directions will it move in during the coming period?

[Tanevski] The DEM is participating more and more actively in international cooperation with neighboring countries and with international ecological foundations. Our intention is to open ourselves up as much as possible to all European and world ecological movements and ecological institutions, for the purpose of exchanging experiences and obtaining material assistance through concrete cooperation. There is a strong trend in Europe toward establishing ties with the Eastern countries where

ecological conditions are much worse, and it is in Europe's interest to help resolve them.

In the middle of November, a significant European conference was held in Vienna with the slogan "East-West Economic Reconstruction," which two of our representatives attended. This conference was attended by representatives of the most important ecological movements and institutions in Europe, as well as representatives of the World Bank, the Regional Ecological Center in Budapest, the European Ecological Center in Brussels, etc. At the end of November our representatives attended the Second Balkan Meeting in Sofia, which was sponsored by the Environmental Protection Agency of Germany's Ministry of Ecology.

We have direct contacts with Germany's ecologists, with whom we are agreeing upon concrete cooperation for the protection of Lake Ohrid, we are contacting Greek ecologists regarding the protection of Lake Dojran, and we likewise have fruitful cooperation with ecologists from Bulgaria and Serbia. We applied for membership in FOEI [Friends of the Earth International], which is one of the most important ecological associations in the world, and then we are cooperating with Green Way, Ecological Bricks [as published], the Regional Ecological Center in Budapest, etc.

These are very important activities of the DEM, since through them we have internationalized the most important ecological problems in Macedonia, which we think can be solved by involving material resources and technical assistance from the international ecological institutions. The problem of Lake Dojran was included in the declaration from the last European conference in Vienna ("East-West Ecological Reconstruction"), and documentation on the condition of this lake has also been prepared. The problem of Lake Ohrid, for which international assistance has likewise been requested, has also been raised. We have asked the international ecological foundations for funds to organize an international symposium at which the condition of Lake Prespa and its immediate vicinity will be defined for the purpose of its protection.

All of this means that our goal is to help our republic, through intensive international cooperation, to solve its ecological problems as quickly and as well as possible.

[Meandziski] For some time there were certain disagreements, and even open confrontations, in the DEM. Can it already be said that the situation has been consolidated, and can the realization of the activities planned be continued without interference?

[Tanevski] There are no confrontations, but there are disagreements. This is more a question of the normal human weaknesses of people who work voluntarily with a great deal of sacrifice, and moreover most of society and the DEM are working under very difficult conditions with respect to finances and office spaces. In any

case, the DEM's leadership is striving to have the DEM become a mass ecological association of all citizens of Macedonia, regardless of their political and ethnic identity, who want to help solve the republic's ecological problems. It is something different if some of the members have a different approach to resolving them. There is nothing bad about that. On the contrary, we need to help form ecological societies or groups that will spread the ecological idea in different ways.

For example, it is desirable to form ecological patrols that will help citizens to organize and protest when ecological incidents occur. Certainly more radical groups will be formed, which will have different forms of pressure. It is desirable to form small ecological groups for the protection of specific forest regions, for the protection of specific flora, or the protection of a specific type of bird, etc. That is what ecologists should have different means of fighting for, but that will make our Movement richer. As for all the other weaknesses of a subjective or objective nature that exist or will exist, we have to overcome them in the interest of greater success for our work in the future.

[Meandziski] What are the basic directions of the program for the DEM's further work, what are its priority tasks, and can any significant innovations be expected in the Movement's overall public involvement?

[Tanevski] The DEM is forming an executive committee with several commissions: for the coordination of ecological societies, for contacts with republic institutions and authorities, an international commission, and an expert-scientific commission. In this way the DEM has organizationally become visibly stronger, since a broad range of people and ecological societies have been included. A committee to save Lake Dojran and a committee to save Macedonia's forests have been formed in order to emphasize individual problems. The priority ecological problems that have been included in our program are our three lakes: Dojran, Ohrid, and Prespa; the Vardar, Bregalnica, and Pcinja rivers; and also the problem with the pollution of Titov Veles.

It has been agreed that in addition to the activities to solve the republic's ecological problems, particular attention is to be focused on international activity. In that way, the international public will be acquainted with our ecological problems, which will be treated as joint European ones. That is a fundamental innovation in our involvement. The second innovation is that we want to use the expert-scientific commission to put the solution of certain problems on an expert level, with arguments and with a professional attitude, thus establishing ourselves as a significant public force in the republic. I hope that the time of the ecologists is coming, and that soon our goals will become the common goal of all Macedonia's citizens. I invite all the Movement's sympathizers who feel the need to call our "green" telephone number, 220-518.

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